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ABSTRACT 
 
ROBERT DALTON CAPPS: War Chiefs and Generals: The 
Transformation of Warfare in the Eastern Woodlands 
(Under the direction of Dr. Mikaëla Adams) 
 
  
In this thesis, I examine how military strategies and tactics of Native Americans 
and Euro Americans changed over time after they came into contact with each other in 
the Eastern Woodlands. I accomplish this goal by covering in detail three conflicts: 
Hernando De Soto’s expedition into the Southeastern United States, King Philip’s War, 
and the Northwest Indian War. By using these three conflicts, I examine this 
transformation from both a temporal and spatial perspective. I approach this point of 
inquiry by using a variety of primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources 
come from a variety of fields, but mainly history and ethnohistory. I explore the weapons, 
armor, and leaders in each conflict. I also describe in detail each of the essential 
campaigns to illustrate a combatants’ strategies and an assortment of battles to illustrate 
the combatants’ tactics. Each individual conflict serves two purposes. The first is to find 
any small-scale changes that occurred within the timeline of the conflict itself. The 
second purpose is to use these wars as measuring sticks for broader changes that 
happened over several centuries of contact and conflict. In the conclusion I demonstrate 
common themes of change that can be explained by using these particular conflicts.  Each 
chapter reveals something new and interesting about Native and Euro-American Warfare 
that relates to the transformation of military thought. In the conclusion, I cover themes I 
believe exemplify the change and continuity of warfare in the Eastern Woodlands. Some 
of these themes include usage of firearms, Native fortifications, and use of war animals.  
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Introduction:  
The Battleground 
 
The history of human kind is filled with violence and warfare. Some wars were 
fought for land and resources; others were fought because of differences in ideologies 
and philosophies. Military strategists and tacticians learn from their predecessors so that 
they do not make the same mistakes. They read the accounts of great commanders in 
order to follow their lead, hence why military academies study military theory. In this 
thesis, I examine how the interactions of Native American tribes and Euro-American 
militaries changed warfare in the Eastern Woodlands of North America over almost three 
centuries of contact and conflict. I use Hernando De Soto’s expedition, King Philip’s 
War, and the Northwest Indian War as measurements of this change. I have studied 
military evolution because I want to add to our understanding of how these conflicts 
shaped the Eastern Woodlands. The political landscape of the area east of the Mississippi 
River was directly impacted by the outcomes of these conflicts. By studying the military 
nature of these conflicts, we can further understand the colonial process in North 
America.   
  I argue that these three conflicts were pivotal points in time and space, or as I call 
them, benchmarks of military evolution. De Soto’s expedition in 1539-1543 was the first 
prolonged contact between Native groups and European powers in what is now the 
Eastern United States. King Philip’s War, which started in 1675, serves as a good 
midway point since Native groups still exerted control over much of the east coast. 
Although European powers had begun colonizing the region, they had not yet reached the 
height of their power. The Northwest Indian War serves as a good ending point, because 
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it was the first prolonged Indian conflict experienced by the newly established United 
States, although certainly not the last. Each one of these conflicts had lasting effects on 
the region in which they were fought. The loss of Indian land or the transformation of 
Indian life ways are just two examples. On the other side of the battleground, Western 
powers colonized a new land and these frontier experiences helped shaped their 
developing national identities. By examining these conflicts as benchmarks we can see 
the status of military tactics and strategy at that time, which allows us to see change over 
time once we have covered all three conflicts.  
 As I examine these conflicts in greater detail a wider picture begins to appear. The 
point of all this is to examine change over time, but this comes in many forms including 
adaptation, military consistencies, integration of new technologies, and shifts in ideas of 
warfare. In the body chapters of the thesis, I examine the three conflicts in detail; in the 
conclusion, I look at several themes and how they changed over time as seen through 
these conflicts. Some of these themes show no significant change, but that only 
strengthens the argument here. In order to show change it is necessary to understand what 
parts stay the same. Through this thesis, I hope to increase our understanding of military 
transformation in the Eastern Woodlands. The reason why I want to do this is because it 
has not been given the attention it deserves. Most historians simply state what has 
transpired without connecting it with the surrounding changes. I want to show the 
interconnectedness of military history in the Eastern Woodlands, not simply show what 
transpired. 
 The larger aim of this thesis is not only to understand military heritage but also to 
make sense of how Euro-Americans shifted the power balance in their favor in the 
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Eastern Woodlands. During my research, most of the histories I study focused on the 
English, French, and American militaries, without giving any credit to how the early 
Spanish conquistadors affected this same area. The early Spanish conquistadors had an 
immense impact on the status of the Mississippian chiefdoms. Natives did not have the 
same concepts of land ownership as westerners, although they had defined territories that 
they controlled. Differences in ideas about land use impacted how Native people dealt in 
early treaties with Europeans. Once Natives realized what was happening, military 
resistance was their only option to defend their remaining lands. I am making this point, 
because it is a central theme to these conflicts. These conflicts did not take place on some 
foreign soil, but on Native lands and colonized land. If we can understand the western 
pursuit of land for exploitation and colonization we can understand why Native people 
pushed so hard against their incursions. 
Historians and ethnohistorians have written at great length about both De Soto’s 
expedition and the other conflicts we will cover, not to mention the numerous first hand 
accounts.1 There has been plenty written about military tactics and strategy, but this often 
centers on the English and Americans with no regards to Spanish influence.2 By 
including De Soto in this thesis, I hope to further expand our understanding of Native and 
Western interactions. There are several individuals that include both Native and western 
tactics in their writings, but even these tend to tell more of the European story. This is not 
to say that there is not writing about Natives at all, because there are substantial books 
about Native culture and Native warfare. Yet, once again these books are purposefully 																																																								
1 Benjamin Church, Diary of King Philip's War 1675-76 (Chester, Connecticut: The Pequot Press, 1975); 
Luys De Biedma, “Relation of the Island of Florida”, in vol. 1 of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. 
Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr, and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993). 
2 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1998); John Grenier, The First Way of War (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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one sided.3 My purpose is to set out a comprehensive side-by-side comparison of both 
Native tactics and strategy with Western tactics and strategy. 
To illuminate these conflicts, I take a comprehensive and comparative 
perspective. Using primary and secondary sources, I give a short, but inclusive look at the 
conflicts in question. In each conflict chapter I cover briefly the start of the conflict, its 
leaders, the equipment, and then I delve into the campaign strategies and battle tactics. 
Each of these sections includes a western and Native perspective. At the end of each 
section I attempt to look for any small-scale changes that may have occurred within the 
scope of that particular conflict. After covering each of these conflicts in such fashion, I 
compare and contrast how each group did or did not change over time and space. Some 
of the themes I discuss will apply to both groups, but others will apply to only one, 
because it is a component unique to their style of warfare.  
To accomplish these goals, I approach these conflicts from an ethnohistorical 
standpoint. Ethnohistory is a combination of history, ethnography, archaeological 
evidence, Native beliefs, and oral traditions. As many Native groups have no written 
records for the time periods I cover, many of the points about Native social structure and 
military traditions will come from this discipline. Military history plays an equally 
important role. Since this thesis is about examining military change over time, it goes 
without saying that much of the content will come from sources that deal specifically 
																																																								
3 John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000); 
Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 1776-1865 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1963), 50. 
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with military interactions.4 I attempt to combine these two areas of thought in order to 
present a cohesive argument about military change over time.  
Each of these conflicts was fought between a different western power and 
different combinations of Native tribes. In De Soto’s entrada, the combatants were the 
Spanish against various Mississippian chiefdoms. King Philip’s War involved the English 
colonies of the Northeast against a loose coalition of Native people under Metacomet. In 
the Northwest Indian War, the newly established American state went to war against a 
pan-Indian resistance imbedded in the Ohio Territory. Although these wars were 
separated by time and place, by examining them together, we see snapshots of the gradual 
change of warfare over time.   
My chapters are ordered chronologically beginning with Hernando De Soto. In 
this chapter, I review the events that lead to the excursion. After discussing details such 
as weapons and armor, I begin to look at the De Soto campaign from an overall 
standpoint. Once this has been accomplished I review particulars in battle tactics by 
looking at three battles Napituca, Mabila, and Chicaza from both the Native and Spanish 
perspectives. I then look how the expedition affected the Southeast. Finally I expose 
changes in minor military reforms. 
In the next chapter on King Philip’s War, I begin with some background on the 
causes of the war. I also provide a brief context about the status of the different tribes and 
colonists at the time of conflict, including their equipment. Next, I present the overall 
stratagem used by both sides and examine individual battles. These battles include the 
Battle of Pease Field, Great Swamp, and Bridgewater. During the examination of these 																																																								
4 M. L. Brown, Firearms in Colonial America (Washington City: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980); 
Wayne William Van Horne, The Warclub: Weapon and Symbol in Southeastern Indian Societies (Ann 
Arbor: U.M.I., 1993). 
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battles I examine specific tactics and combat styles. Lastly, I look for any small-scale 
changes and the after-effects of the war. 
The last body chapter consists of an in-depth look at the Northwest Indian War. 
This war was the longest of all three. I begin by looking at the early raids and escalation 
of this conflict. As with the other conflicts, I also introduce the weapons, leaders, and 
other equipment. The Northwest Indian War had extensive campaigns, which I expose 
and provide the Native responses to said campaigns. The battles I examine in this chapter 
are Harmar’s Defeat, St. Clair’s Defeat, and Fallen Timbers. I use these battles and the 
early raids to show how Native in the Ohio Territory and the American State conducted 
warfare in this region. 
 In his groundbreaking work On War, nineteenth-century military theorist Carl von 
Clauswitz said that, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means. The 
political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be 
considered in isolation from their purpose.”5 It is important to understand the human and 
political aspect of war, not just the battle strategy. This thesis demonstrates that conflicts 
do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they are symptoms of larger issues in the colonial 
process. In all three cases there were political agendas at work that complicated not only 
the start of these conflicts, but the continuation and endings as well. In all of the conflicts 
I examine, Euro-American powers sought to exert control over Native land. When 
peaceful political negotiations or relations began to deteriorate with Native tribes, conflict 
often broke out. During De Soto’s expedition however, Mississippian chiefdoms did not 
have preexisting political relations with the Spanish Empire. Instead, the Spanish 																																																								
5 Carl Von Clauswitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) 87. 
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attempted to find ways of colonizing this area as other conquistadors had done in Central 
and South America. Native Americans had their own distinct political reasons for 
fighting these wars. Most of them seemed to be a reaction to European or American 
encroachment. I explore the specifics of these reasons in the subsequent chapters.    
 As we take our journey through these conflicts pay close attention to the 
similarities and differences between how each group utilizes their strengths and 
weaknesses. Some groups made small adjustments in the wars in which they fought, 
while others made virtually no changes throughout the conflict. Most of the changes I 
focus on took place over the broad spectrum of time and will come in the conclusion of 
this piece. We will start this journey in chronological order beginning with De Soto’s 
expedition.  
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Chapter I 
Hernando De Soto’s Expedition in the 
American Southeast: 1539-1542 
To be the first Europeans to see the great chiefdoms of the American Southeast 
must have been quite the experience. Yet, these same Europeans faced a hard military 
expedition through hostile territory. Some of the chiefdoms and groups they encountered 
faired better than others against the Spanish. Taking this entrada from the other 
perspective, the Native groups must have been in awe of what the Spaniards brought with 
them to the New World. Steel equipment and, most of all, horses made the Spanish a very 
deadly adversary. Hernando De Soto’s expedition into the American Southeast is the 
beginning point for my comparison of the transformation of military strategy and tactics 
between Native groups east of the Mississippi and Western powers. The De Soto entrada 
was the first prolonged excursion by European powers throughout what would become 
the Southeastern United States. De Soto’s entrada shows how the first prolonged contact 
between European and Native American militaries played out by illustrating the earliest 
tactics and strategies used by both powers. 
There are two concepts that need to be laid out before the examination of the 
expedition can begin: the topography of the American Southeast and the geographic 
origin of the combatants. As far as the land is concerned, we should not think of the 
Southeast as we do today. The land that the Spanish traversed looked vastly different 
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from the land we now inhabit. Certain plants such as kudzu, bluegrass, and honeysuckle 
were not present in the New World. In the place of these invasive species, there were 
large and diverse pine and deciduous forests that are absent in many areas today. 6 That is 
not to say that this was virgin forest as the old mantra goes, for that would imply that the 
Native people had had no effect on the environment. Before the arrival of the Spanish, 
Native Americans had long practiced the art of forest management. Native groups burned 
forested areas to create farmland or started brush fires to herd white-tailed deer for 
hunting.7 
The men who composed the Spanish force were not as homogenous as one might 
think, nor did those from Spain consider themselves Spanish. Spain was not even Spain at 
this point in time, but was ruled by the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Some of the 
soldiers did not harken from the Iberian Peninsula at all. Nor were all of the voyagers 
European or men. For example some of the men that went were of African descent. A 
few wives and other female camp followers joined the expedition as well. 8   
Nevertheless, despite their varying political allegiances and diverse backgrounds, the 
members of this expedition considered themselves Christian and referred to themselves 
as Christians. Although the accounts do not agree on the number of men taken on the 
expedition the average number comes to between 650 and 700, but of course these lists 
may not include every person who came along such as slaves.9 Yet, we should not 
consider this force as a national army or a militia like those we will see later on in this 																																																								
6 Charles Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 90-
92. 
7 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 92. 
8 Ignacio Avellaneda, “Hernando de Soto and His Florida Fantasy”, in The Hernando De Soto Expedition: 
History, Historiography, and "Discovery" in the Southeast ed. Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1997), 211. 
9 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 49-50.	
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thesis. Instead it was a pre-modern army in the form of a collective of experienced, semi-
professional soldiers under the command of a colonial governor and not a professional 
general. 
Hernando De Soto’s military decisions were shaped by his prior military 
experiences. De Soto spent most of his life in the New World, arriving at the age of 14.10  
While a page under Pedrarias in Central America, De Soto received combat training, 
namely fencing, under a fellow Spaniard, which turned De Soto into a formidable 
swordsman.11 He came from humble beginnings, and he sought to prove himself like 
others from the same area, including other conquistadors like Francisco Pizzaro.12 De 
Soto’s experiences on expeditions in Central and South America gave him invaluable 
military experience that he drew on during his venture into La Florida, the Spanish 
designation for North America at this time. After leaving Central America, De Soto 
traveled south with the Pizarro brothers where he began to stand out even more in the 
realms of combat and military leadership. After the death of the Incan leader, Pizarro 
made De Soto captain general of the Spanish force and De Soto showed great poise and 
calm during fights with Incan general Quizquiz.13 The experience that De Soto received 
while in central and south America was crucial not only to his decision-making in the 
American Southeast, but also to his ability to lead the expedition at all.   
The combatants on the Native American side included the militaries of various 
groups and chiefdoms such as the Apalachee, Uzachile, Urriparacoxi, Mabila, Alibamo, 
Chicaza, and Quiqualtam. These were not the only Natives groups that De Soto came into 																																																								
10 Miguel Albornoz, Hernando de Soto, Knight of the Americas (New York: Franklin Watts, 1986), 17. 
11 Albornoz, Hernando de Soto, 49. 
12 Curt Lamar, “Hernando de Soto before Florida: A Narrative”, in The Hernando De Soto Expedition ed. 
Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 185. 
13 Lamar, “de Soto before Florida”, 194-198.	
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contact with, nor were they the only people with whom De Soto fought, but these are the 
ones that I will examine here. Not all of these groups were necessarily truly 
Mississippian, as archaeologists define the term. For example, the Safety Harbor people 
of Ozita in present-day central Florida that De Soto encountered first existed in a 
transitional zone. They had some of the elements of Mississippian society, but did not 
display all of its major characteristics.14 Due to lack of written evidence, the history of 
these people come to us through archaeology and the chronicles from these first 
encounters.15 
Unlike De Soto, about whom there is much written, the leaders of the Native 
Americans are shrouded in mystery. We can only know men like Tazcalusa and the Chief 
of Uzachile by their actions and their demeanor according to the Spanish. Yet, Native 
leaders like these are no less important than De Soto. The decision of Tazcalusa to fight 
the Spanish at Mabila became a turning point for the Spanish expedition. In contrast, 
Uzachile’s decision to attempt a surprise ambush at Napituca gave the Spanish an 
opportunity to use their full military capabilities against a Native force. It is unfortunate 
that the rational of Native decisions can never be known for certain, but there are some 
trends that we can analyze for insight into pre-Columbian warfare. For example the 
decision of the Chief of Chicaza to fight the Spanish was most likely driven by the 																																																								
14 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 69-70. 
15 There are four chronicles written by members of the expedition. They are as follows: Garcilaso Del Inca, 
“The History of La Florida” in vol. 2 of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James 
Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993); Gentleman of Elvas, 
“True Relation of the Hardships Suffered by Governor Don Hernando De Soto and Certain Portuguese 
Gentlemen in the Discovery of the Province of Florida,” in vol. 1 of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence 
A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1993); Rodrigo Rangel, “Account of the Northern Conquest and Discovery of Hernando De Soto,” in vol. 1 
of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993); Luys De Biedma, “Relation of the Island of Florida”, in 
vol. 1 of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. 
Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993).	
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actions of the Spanish while in Chicazan territory. The Spanish stole from the food stores 
of the Chicaza and took captives, while claiming to be friendly. The Chicazans 
themselves stole hogs from the Spanish, but were punished by having their hands cut 
off.16 Given these circumstances, we can surmise that the Chief of Chicaza intended to 
punish the Spanish for their misbehavior and restore the balance of power between 
Natives and newcomers.  
 To make sense of the military encounters between the Mississippians and De 
Soto’s army, we must also consider their weapons and other items of war. The Spanish 
brought a multitude of equipment to the Americas. In melee combat the Spanish utilized 
swords, halberds, axes, and knives.17 The most important feature of these items is that 
they were made of steel and not wood. The distinction between wood and steel in the 
arms is important, but a person’s skill with that any weapon is paramount. A Native 
warrior with a wooden war club could fight just as effectively as a Spaniard with a steel 
sword. However, a steel sword fares far better against bare skin than a wooden club does 
against steel armor. A halberd is a long pole arm, similar to a pike in that it can be used to 
dismount men from horseback, except that instead of just a spear point it includes an axe-
like head.  A group of 60 halberdiers guarded De Soto throughout the expedition.18 The 
																																																								
16 Gentleman of Elvas, “True Relation of the Hardships Suffered by Governor Don Hernando De Soto and 
Certain Portuguese Gentlemen in the Discovery of the Province of Florida,” in vol. 1 of The De Soto 
Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1993), 105-106. 
17 Wayne William Van Horne, The Warclub: Weapon and Symbol in Southeastern Indian Societies (Ann 
Arbor: U.M.I., 1993), 81. 
18 Avellaneda, “Hernando de Soto and His Florida Fantasy”, 214. 
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Spanish also used steel axes to break through palisades, such as the one at the Battle of 
Mabila.19 
 For long-range weaponry the Spanish used the crossbow and an early firearm 
known as the arquebus. The arquebus was an early matchlock-style firearm. A matchlock 
firearm utilizes a lit match to light a priming pad, which then ignites the powder charge to 
fire a projectile. 20 The arquebus, although a staple of the Spanish conquests, was not 
always the most successful weapon. Especially in the case of De Soto’s expedition, the 
mobility of the Native people did not allow for the clean shot needed for the arquebus to 
be effective. The same could be said of the crossbow. Tactically the arquebus, or any 
early firearm for that matter, was good against people massed in formations, but against 
quick moving warriors with no armor to hold them down the arquebus lost its edge. 
Another issue was the logistics of supplying gunpowder and shot. The Spanish did not 
have the ability to make gunpowder on the march.  The crossbow offered fewer logistical 
problems because they could refashion bolts. While on the march after the battle with the 
Chicaza, for instance, the Spanish established a forge where they repaired their arms and 
armor, presumably also fashioning new bolts.21 Even though the crossbow had its own 
issues with hitting its targets because of the mobility of the Indian warriors, the 
crossbows were more accurate and more numerous on the expedition than the arquebus. 
 Defensively, the Spanish had shields, light armor, and heavy armor, all of which 
came with their own sets of advantages and disadvantages. The greatest advantage was 
																																																								
19 Garcilaso Del Inca, “The History of La Florida” in vol. 2 of The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. 
Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1993), 339.	
20 M. L. Brown, Firearms in Colonial America (Washington City: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980), 41-
42. 
21 Elvas, “True Relation of the Hardships Suffered by Governor Don Hernando De Soto”, 109. 
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the ability of these armors to either deflect or lessen the penetration of Native arrows. 
Even the light armor made of layered quilt pads softened the blow of an arrow to the 
point of not allowing series injury.22 Heavy armor posed some problems. Although it 
deflected arrows and softened blows from clubs, heavy armor limited a Spanish soldier’s 
mobility because it was large and covered most of the torso and upper body. The weight 
could also prove a death trap. On multiple occasions when crossing waterways, men 
wearing heavy armor drowned because of the weight. Most notably during the battle 
against the Quiqualtam, a canoe was overturned causing several Spanish in full armor to 
sink to the bottom of the Mississippi River and drown.23 
 In addition to steel weaponry, the Spanish also used animals of war. War dogs and 
seasoned battle horses gave the Spanish an important military advantage. Although the 
Natives had some small, domesticated dogs, they had nothing like the war mastiffs and 
greyhounds used by the Spanish. 24 The Spanish used these dogs to chase down fleeing 
Indians.25  The Spanish brought 243 horses on the voyage, but only about 220 made it to 
landfall in present-day Florida.26 Horses gave De Soto a great military advantage. The 
Native people in the American Southeast had never seen such an animal before and they 
had few ways of defending themselves against them. Horses made the Spanish much 
more mobile and offered the soldiers height, force, and protection as they engaged Native 
people in combat. Indians, however, quickly learned how to mitigate this advantage, and 
afterwards targeted horses in their assaults on the Spanish. Another sort of defense 																																																								
22 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 68.	
23 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 392. 
24 Garcilaso, “La Florida”, 152, 459. 
25 Ralph H. Vigil, “The Expedition of Hernando de Soto and the Spanish Struggle for Justice”, in The 
Hernando De Soto Expedition ed. Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 342. 
26 Rodrigo Rangel, “Account of the Northern Conquest and Discovery of Hernando De Soto,” in vol. 1 of 
The De Soto Chronicles ed. Lawrence A. Clayton, Vernon James Knight Jr., and Edward C. Moore 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 254. 
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mounted against the horses occurred in present-day Florida. During De Soto’s march out 
of the swamp of Ocale and into Apalachee territory, the Apalachee Indians set up barriers 
for the horses by tying poles to trees.27 These barriers slowed down the Spanish advance 
by impeding the horses’ movements, but were not effective in killing or hurting any of 
the horses.   
 Native American weapons, on the other hand, were less numerous in type, but no 
less impressive in design. The two most important Native American weapons were the 
bow and the war club. The bow, used by essentially every group the Spanish faced, was 
constructed from a multitude of woods including “hickory, ash, and black locust.”28 The 
chronicles of De Soto are thick with descriptions of the accuracy of the Native American 
man with a bow. These sixteenth-century bows were different from bows used in later 
conflicts in that these bows tended to be much larger. The bows were “a moderately long 
D-bow – with a length of about fifty to sixty inches – and with a pull of weight of about 
fifty pounds.”29 Native American warriors’ ability to use these bows was not to be trifled 
with. There were several cases throughout the expedition where the accuracy of these 
bows showed the Native’s ability to use them as well as any Spaniard could use a 
crossbow. One example comes from the Battle of Mabila: a Native warrior on top of a 
palisade wall shot Carlos Enríquz, who was on horseback, in the throat, one of the few 
areas not protected by some kind of armor. 30  
																																																								
27 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 118-119.	
28 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 17. 
29 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 18. 
30 Gregory A. Waselkov. “What Do Spanish Expeditionary Artifacts of Circa 1540 Look Like and How 
Often Are They Preserved”, in The Search for Mabila ed. James Vernon Knight Jr. (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 2009), 94.	
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 A direct comparison of Native bows and Spanish crossbows provides insight into 
the utility and accuracy of these weapons. During the Battle of the Alibamo Fort there 
was a one-on-one stand off between the Spanish and the Alibamo Indians. An Indian on 
the opposite side of the river adjacent to the fort challenged one of the Spanish to a 
shooting match. After readying their respective weapons the two fired at the same time. 
The Spaniard hit the Indian square in the chest, most likely killing him instantly, while 
the Native’s arrow struck the Spaniard in the neck just below the left ear.31 It may appear 
in this instance that the Spaniard was more accurate, but that is a misleading assumption. 
Although we do not know the distance between the two men, it apparently was not a long 
shot, for the shooters seemed to be within both weapons’ effective ranges. The Indian 
warrior was given less of a target area than the Spanish soldier, however, since the 
Spaniard turned his body sideways and wore armor. It appeared that the Spaniard hit the 
Native in the middle of his chest, and the Native hit the Spaniard in the neck area just 
below the ear, a place unprotected by armor.32 Both men made great shots, but for the 
Native to hit an area so small was an astonishing display of accuracy. 
 The war club was the Southeastern Indian warrior’s weapon of choice at close 
range. Like the bow these war clubs varied in the type of wood used in their construction, 
but possibly more important was the diversity of their design. As various as the 
chiefdoms that used them, the war club could be made into a multitude of designs such as 
the globe form, sword form, spatulate, staff, and sword with globe head.33 These weapons 
were hand-carved and crafted with specific goals in mind. The most common and most 
sophisticated type of club was the sword club or falchion style. It resembles a curved 																																																								
31 Garcilaso, “La Florida”, 382-383. 
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sword with a smaller striking area.34 This design is opposed to a club with has a rounded 
striking area. The Southeastern chiefdoms also had pikes or spears, but initially they did 
not know how to use them against armored horses. 35  
 Native warriors did not have any substantial defensive equipment, at least when 
compared to Spanish armor. They did have defensive constructs such as palisades, which 
will be discussed later in the chapter. There is some evidence that they had reed or wicker 
breastplates along with some sort of bark helmet, but in the Southeast even this was a 
rarity. They also carried wicker shields.36 Rangel reports in his account how these wicker 
shields were so closely packed that a crossbow bolt would not penetrate them.37 Despite 
the fact that Southeastern warriors did not have western-style armor that does not mean 
that they went into battle completely naked. According to Charles Hudson, “a breechcloth 
and moccasins of brain-tanned deerskin” were the standard clothes worn into battle.38 
 For the purpose of this analysis, the De Soto expedition should be thought of as a 
one long campaign. As De Soto traversed what is today known as the Southeastern 
United States (see Figure 1), he came into contact with numerous chiefdoms and 
indigenous people. It is important to note that the route he took was not straight or 
preplanned. De Soto followed some preexisting trails, but was also directed by Native 
interpreters and slaves. There were even some moments when De Soto and his men were 
left wandering in the wilderness. This examination of the expedition however, ends 
before De Soto crosses the Mississippi River in order to stay consistent with the rest of 
this thesis.  																																																								
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Figure 1: Map of De Soto Expedition. Source: Charles Hudson, “The Historical Significance of 
the Soto Route,” in The Hernando De Soto Expedition, ed. Patricia Galloway (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 320. 
 The Spanish embarked on their entrada with a list of specific goals and therefore 
they made particular strategic, logistical, and tactical decisions to accomplish their aims. 
The main goal was the search for riches and by extension to explore and establish a 
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colony.39 Therefore, the military decisions made by De Soto were in regards to these 
overarching goals, notwithstanding his goal of conquest.40 In these military decisions, I 
include logistical ones such as searching and obtaining food items. The maintenance of 
an army deep in hostile territory requires a constant supply of food. An army cannot fight 
while it is hungry. De Soto, knowing this, took from Native corn stores like those at 
Chicaza or asked for supplies from the local cacique.41  
It is difficult to determine any overall Native American strategic plan of 
resistance. One reason for this difficulty is that the Spanish were not privy to any Indian 
war talks and thus the documents are silent on this topic. However, the documents 
indicate that there was no unified resistance with all the Native groups banding together. 
The mixture of chiefdoms and paramount chiefdoms did not allow for a unified Indian 
resistance under any one man or group since each chiefdom was autonomous and acted 
independently from other chiefdoms. Moreover, certain chiefdoms were rivals or 
enemies, which precluded them from joining in an alliance against the Spanish. For the 
most part, there was no systematic resistance orchestrated on a large scale by multiple 
groups or even a single group. Each chiefdom acted to protect its own individual 
interests.  
There were, however, regional efforts to resist the Spanish. The Indians in Florida 
like the Apalachee and Uzachile, for example, constantly harried the Spanish using 
guerrilla tactics over a long period of time. No other Native group, at least in our area of 
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examination, harassed the Spanish for as long or as continually as the groups in Florida. 
However, these Florida Indians most likely were not coordinated, but working 
independently for the same goal. Native strategies mostly involved pushing the Spanish 
out of their territory. Once across polity borders, the Spanish became another group’s 
concern. Native warfare was not necessarily aimed at annihilating one’s enemy, but about 
maintaining a balance of power and protecting one’s interest within a certain defined 
territory. 
Native tactics fall under two categories: guerilla attacks and formal battles. 
Guerrilla tactics consisted of coordinated ambushes and small raids. In other words, 
Native warriors used hit and run tactics. A formal battle for Native warriors resembled a 
style of warfare that would have been more familiar to the Spanish. During formal 
battles, Native chiefdoms called up large numbers of men and used them in formation 
with coordinated movements, similar to a European concept of a standing army.42 
Although both tactics hurt the Spanish greatly in their own right, it would ultimately be 
the combination of both tactics over time that would cause the Spanish to eventually 
withdraw to back to Mexico.  
Guerrilla tactics can best be examined through case studies. De Soto met 
resistance from the outset of his expedition in modern-day Florida, which continued 
through almost the entire journey through the region. The Apalachee put up a particularly 
sustained resistance. This resistance ended fairly abruptly when De Soto reached present-
day Georgia, and apparently moved out of Apalachee territory. While in Florida multiple 
groups, including Apalachee, Ozita, Ocale, Acuera, and the people subject to chief 
Uzachile, resisted the Spanish using guerrilla tactics.  																																																								
42 Hudson, Knights of Spain, Warriors of the Sun, 21. 
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Two examples, one with the people of Ocale and the other with the Apalachee, 
demonstrate this tactic. The swamp of Ocale worked to the advantage of Ocale warriors. 
The Spanish were unable to utilize the advantage of their horses in the swamp against the 
Ocale warriors, who managed to kill or wound several Spanish.43 The swampy conditions 
were not ideal for cavalry charges. The horses could not maneuver effectively and would 
have to move slowly through the mud. Specifically with the Ocale, Rangel notes that the 
Native warriors picked off stragglers, “But they [the Indians] had already wounded some 
soldiers who strayed and had killed a crossbowman who was named Mendoza.”44 While 
in Apalachee territory, the Apalachee like the Ocale used the terrain to their advantage by 
taking away the mobility of the Spanish horses and making quick strikes against the 
Spanish.45 The Spanish horses were not able to maneuver in swamps effectively, because 
of the marshy conditions.  
These attacks did not happen in a vacuum. It is important to understand why these 
groups attacked the Spanish. Although we can never know the exact motives of the 
attacks we can look at some common themes. For example, when De Soto reached the 
first town under the control of the Apalachee they took slaves. This, in conjunction with 
the taking of corn stores, caused the Apalachee to retaliate. Moreover, the Apalachee had 
had contact with the Spanish before. When Narvaéz came through Florida several years 
before De Soto, Narvaéz fought against the Apalachee and the Apalachee undoubtedly 
learned from that encounter. When the Spanish came to the first town under Apalachee 
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influence, the Natives were caught unaware. Soon after, however, Apalachee warriors 
began a series of guerrilla attacks to resist De Soto’s advance.46 
These guerrilla tactics were by far the most successful tactics used against the 
Spanish. Even though they were never able to inflict heavy losses, the constant 
harassment exacted its due toll. One casualty here and there may not seem very 
significant, but when an army has a fixed number of individuals every death matters. 
Psychologically, the constant harassment worried the Spanish and kept them up at night, 
like when De Soto first entered Apalachee territory and the Apalachee warriors hollered 
all night keeping the Spanish on guard.47 During the winter of 1539-1540, the Apalachee 
also continuously brandished their arms to keep the Spanish on guard, and the Spanish 
could not maintain such a state of vigilance without it having negative effects.48 The 
constant reminders of the presence of the Native warriors kept the Spanish awake to the 
point that it affected their ability to fight in battle.49 The Chicaza would do the same thing 
about two years later. 
 Also while De Soto was in Florida, the local Indians of Napituca attacked the 
Spanish. The exact date of the Battle of Napituca is unknown, but it occurred somewhere 
on a plain before two lakes between the September 16 and September 22 of 1539.50 At 
the appointed time when De Soto was to meet with the chiefs representing Uzachile, 300-
400 warriors poured out from the nearby forest, hoping to surprise the Spanish. However, 
a Native interpreter had warned De Soto of the plan before the battle commenced, so the 
Spanish troops were prepared for battle. De Soto immediately released his cavalry against 																																																								
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the Natives, many of whom fled back into the forest, but not before 30 to 40 had been 
killed. 51 As the Native force retreated, some of the warriors took refuge in the two lakes. 
While in this position the Spanish and Natives exchanged ranged fire, but not to the 
benefit of either side. The Native warriors under siege in the lake grew tired and slowly 
began to surrender to De Soto.52  
 One reason for the success of the Spanish at Napituca was the advantageous 
terrain for horses and the ability of the Spanish, with advance warning, to mount a 
successful counterattack with the full use of their arms and skill. If this battle had taken 
place in an enclosed area like the swamps the Spanish had been traversing, the Natives 
may have had better success against the Spanish. The Natives also played into Spanish 
hands by fighting them in open field combat. The superiority of Spanish armor helped De 
Soto achieve victory. In this instance, arrows fired from the lakes were not able to 
penetrate Spanish cuirasses. The Spanish also outnumbered the Natives about two to one. 
Even if the goal of the Native warriors was not to utterly vanquish the Spanish, but to 
simply defeat them in battle and force them to move on, the Natives made a serious 
miscalculation in this endeavor.  
 After this initial combat at Napituca, the Spanish captured some 300 Native 
warriors and women. These captives decided that servitude under the Spanish was not an 
option. Using whatever weapons they could, they attempted to overthrow their Spanish 
captors, but for most it was a fruitless endeavor.53 The sheer pandemonium that ensued 
from this attempt at freedom was quite dramatic, with tables turning over, shouting, 
yelling, and chains clanking. The captive Natives used whatever they could to strike harm 																																																								
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against the Spanish; they even managed to successfully injure De Soto. Unfortunately for 
the Natives, the arms they acquired, such as plates, tables, and sticks, were not enough to 
deal the substantial blows necessary to gain their freedom.54 Many of the Natives who 
rebelled fell under the Spanish sword. 
 It shows great fortitude and courage on the side of the Natives to make an attempt 
to overthrow their captors. That being said, not all of the Natives were participants in this 
fight, for some could not escape their shackles.55 As we will see later on, this was not the 
last time that Native captives or would-be captives refused to be held under the Spanish 
flag. During the Battle of Mabila, the Native warriors released several of the burden 
bearers that De Soto had brought with him. Burden bearers were integral to De Soto’s 
expedition. These captives served several purposes. Some were used in prisoner 
exchanges, the women were used as sex slaves and camp aids, and all carried Spanish 
goods and equipment. On multiple occasions, De Soto had several hundred burden 
bearers with his men. When De Soto left for Cofitachequi, for example the caciques of 
Ocute and Cofaqui gave the Spanish some 800 burden bearers to carry the Spaniards’ 
supplies.56 Native leaders gave the Spanish these bearers in an effort to build an alliance 
with De Soto, or, more likely, as appeasement for their demands so that they would leave. 
These burden bearers given to De Soto were most likely war captives.  
 Even though there was no active military resistance by the Native people from 
present-day Georgia to modern-day Alabama, this portion of the expedition reveals much 
about Spanish logistics. One can see that most of De Soto’s decisions were made with 
either food or wealth in mind. De Soto was often driven by tales of rich cities. En route 																																																								
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through present-day Georgia, De Soto heard stories from local Natives of powerful 
chiefdoms to the north; he also heard about possible gold. Although we cannot know for 
sure, it would have been apparent to the Indians that De Soto was looking for something. 
If they could convince De Soto to go looking for it somewhere else, they did. It is likely 
that many of these chiefdoms did not want to fight De Soto, but simply wanted him to 
leave. If they could accomplish this by sending De Soto somewhere else they did so. De 
Soto also made travel decisions based on food; at times his supplies were low and he 
needed to resupply.57 For example, while stuck in the wilderness of Ocute, an uninhabited 
region near the Savannah River, De Soto ordered his men to eat as little food as possible, 
because the land was not inhabited, and the troops moved quickly and covered as much 
ground as possible.58 Since this land was uninhabited there was no corn for the Spanish to 
appropriate.  
What we have in the case of the wilderness of Ocute and other uninhabited zones 
is a forced march. A forced march, championed by great military commanders such as 
Alexander the Great, occurs when an army is made to march longer or farther than 
normal. It can be caused by a lack of supplies or necessities. In the pre-Columbian South 
buffer zones, according to anthropologist David Dye, were, “large, uninhabited areas 
between neighboring communities that are maintained through fear of raiding parties.”59 
They were polity borders that helped to separate chiefdoms from one another. Without 
Native inhabitants, these buffer zones could not provide De Soto’s army with the supplies 
and resources they needed for a long stay or leisurely pace. The wilderness of Ocute is 
one of the larger buffer zones that De Soto encountered. Once exiting the wilderness of 																																																								
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Ocute, De Soto traveled through much of what are today the states of Georgia, South 
Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama.  
 Although De Soto’s trek into present-day Alabama did not see direct military 
action, the army had to remain constantly vigilant due to continual harassment by local 
Indians. The second direct assault did not occur until they reached the town of Mabila, in 
present-day central Alabama. The Battle of Mabila was not only one of the most 
important battles of De Soto’s campaign, but also one of the most important that occurred 
in the Western hemisphere.60 Even though it was a pyrrhic victory for the Spanish, it was 
not the biggest military failure of the expedition from a tactical standpoint. Once under 
attack, De Soto managed to take the town and set it on fire.  Mabila was the first and only 
hostile meeting with the formidable chief Tazcalusa, but it was also the first large scale 
fight since the Spanish had left Florida. The Battle at Mabila was the first formal-type 
battle used against the Spanish east of the Mississippi River. It is difficult to guess as to 
why Tazcalusa chose a formal battle as opposed to guerrilla tactics, but it is safe to say 
that Tazcalusa believed his warriors were up to the task of fighting the Spanish. The 
battle was apparently a pre-planned ambush. However, De Soto had sent scouts ahead to 
assess the nature of the town, and they relayed to him that the town was filled with armed 
warriors.61  De Soto expected trouble, but that did not dissuade him from going.  
 Mabila was a relatively small, palisaded town. Up to this point the Spanish had 
seen palisades, but they had not had to siege a town protected by one. A typical 
Mississippian palisade was formed by placing vertical columns of logs with crosswise 
split cane bindings covered with a mixture of mud and sod known as daub. Daub was 																																																								
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also used to cover individuals’ houses.62 However, palisades were not universal and, 
according to Timothy Pauketat, the palisades were not only defensive, but offensive as 
well because it allowed the group to “project a large fighting force into distant lands.” In 
other words, if a town did not have a palisade the cacique would need to leave warriors at 
home in case of an attack, whereas walls allowed a cacique to mobilize more warriors.63 
 The Battle of Mabila occurred on October 18, 1540.64 Although this attack was a 
planned, the battle began with an altercation between one of De Soto’s lieutenants, 
Baltasar de Gallegos, and one of Tazcalusa’s principle men. Gallegos, acting as De 
Soto’s captain of the guard, went to fetch Tazcalusa, but seeing his house full of warriors, 
left it. It was at this point that Gallegos took hold of a principal Indian and when the 
Indian made an attempt to pull away Gallegos cut off his arm.65 After this incident 
warriors began filing out of houses and firing arrows at the Spanish vanguard who had 
come into the town. De Soto and his guard and other companions were forced to fight 
their way out of the town. Once the Spanish were outside the walls, the Mabilans 
captured the Spanish supplies and freed the burden bears De Soto had with him.66 
 After this initial foray, De Soto’s main body arrived, because De Soto had gone to 
Mabila ahead of the main body. De Soto then told his heaviest armored men, his lancers, 
to dismount and form up with four squads of footmen to assault the palisade. His lighter 
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armored men mounted the horses and surrounded the town to kill any fleeing Natives.67 
Van Horne notes that in the typical Spanish formation attack the Spanish closed ranks 
and fought as a unit using their pikes and halberds, keeping and killing the Natives from a 
distance. The Native could not strike the unit with their war clubs if they could not get 
past the halberds.68 When De Soto formed up his men into squads this was likely the 
formation these squads took. These four squads attacked the palisade, using their axes to 
expose the wood of the palisade.  They were beaten back and regained the walls again 
using the same tactics as before. Once inside, the Spanish set fire to the town and spared 
no one. At this point, at least from the Spanish perspective, the Mabilans had lost. In 
order to escape capture by the Spanish, the Mabilans either hanged themselves by their 
bowstrings or ran into houses on fire.69 
 The Native forces lost between 2,500 and 3,000 men, although most scholars see 
this as an exaggeration.70 The Spanish lost eighteen men and twelve horses, but this does 
not account for the number of wounds they suffered.71 Spanish armor was to thank for the 
low number of Spanish dead. The biggest blow to the Spanish in this battle was the loss 
of supplies, including clothes, weapons, armor, food, and other items of a non-military 
nature, which were lost in the fire that burned the town. After the battle, De Soto and his 
men spent many days tending their wounds and resupplying as best they could. It took the 
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Spanish some twenty-seven or twenty-eight days to recuperate from the damage they 
suffered at Mabila.72  
 The Natives made two major miscalculations in fighting the Spanish at Mabila 
that anthropologist Charles Hudson very aptly addresses. Hudson states that the Natives 
had underestimated the strength of Spanish armor and that the Natives had stripped 
themselves of their greatest strength, agility, by crowding behind the palisade walls.73 
The closeness of combat allowed the Spanish to fight in formation with the full protection 
of their armor. Not to mention that their armor mostly shielded them from Native arrows. 
In the town of Mabila, the Native numbers were neutralized and Spanish armor and 
weaponry allowed them to kill Natives in mass because the Natives were not able to use 
their mobility to their advantage. As we have already seen, the mobility of Native 
warriors often allowed them to escape the Spanish in their heavy armor, but it also 
allowed them to use guerrilla tactics more effectively. This was not the case when they 
were enclosed behind palisade walls. Another mistake that Tazcalusa made was clearing 
the houses before the palisades, though we do not know why he did this.74 Although 
Tazcalusa could not have known De Soto’s strategy beforehand, clearing the houses only 
made it easier for Spanish horses to move about killing fleeing Natives. Tazcalusa had 
never seen De Soto’s horses, so he may not have understood how they were used in 
battle. It is impossible to know why Tazcalusa made these decisions, because De Soto 
was not present at the war talks and there are no Indian records of the deliberations. 
 The Spanish made effective tactical decisions in this battle, with maybe the 
exception of going to Mabila and entering with so few men in the first place. Yet, De 																																																								
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Soto could not show weakness in the face of his men therefore he had to enter the town. 
De Soto’s decision to split his men into four squads and fight in formation played to 
Spanish strengths, because it allowed them to assault the town on four fronts, which 
prevented the Natives from concentrating their efforts. Setting fire to the town also 
played into Spanish hands, because when forced by the fire to leave the palisade the 
Native warriors met death by lance. Despite all this success, the Spanish received over 
600 individual wounds and were seriously demoralized.75  
 The third battle that I will examine is the battle with Chicaza. After the recovery 
from the Battle of Mabila, the Spanish moved northwest. By this point in the expedition, 
De Soto was afraid of dissension in his midst. While at Mabila, De Soto had received 
word that Spanish ships under Maldonado were on the coast at Ochuse (most likely 
Pensacola or Mobile Bay) only some six days away.76 De Soto feared many of his men 
would want to abandon the expedition and return home on these ships. De Soto had 
experienced dissention in the ranks in Central and South America, and he knew that in 
order to keep his army together he had to press onward. 77  Any rest would give the troops 
a chance to think about what they were doing and probably begin to question De Soto 
himself. De Soto kept this information secret and assembled the troops for the march to 
Chicaza territory.  
 After wintering in Chicaza territory, Chicaza warriors conducted a surprise attack 
against the Spanish on March 4, 1541.78 The relationship between De Soto and Chicaza 
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had deteriorated over the course of the winter for several reasons. Both the Chicaza and 
Spanish were guilty of theft, but also the heavy demands of De Soto and the taking of 
Native food stores likely brought on this fight.79 On the morning of March 4, Chicaza 
warriors in small numbers began moving under cover of darkness towards the town of 
Chicaza, where the Spanish were camped. After a large force of around 300 warriors 
gathered, they entered the camp. After which, the remaining Chicazans started shouting 
and beating drums and rushed into town from four directions in formation and set fire to 
anything and everything with flaming arrows. According to Biedma, the Chicaza warriors 
lit their arrows using little jars, so that the fire could be concealed en route.80 This uproar 
caught the Spanish by surprise causing many of them to flee.81 Unfortunately, the 
Chicazans did not press their advantage. Either by accident or by command, many horses 
were freed from their restraints. The Chicaza warriors mistook this running amok as 
Spanish cavalry and fled the camp, but not before inflicting considerable damage.82 
 What can this battle tell us about Chicaza and Native tactics? For one, the use of 
fire by the Natives was a successful tactical decision because it caused mass confusion, 
but conversely it also factored in their eventual retreat. The smoke most likely masked 
the horses, leading to some confusion about a cavalry counterattack. There is no reason to 
believe that if the Chicaza had known the horses were not mounted that they would not 
have pressed the attack. This was a formal battle and surrounding the Spanish and 
attacking with four squads from four directions worked to the Chicazans’ advantage, 
because they effectively surrounded the Spanish encampment. By surprising the Spanish 																																																								
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at night and neutralizing the Spaniards ability to form squads themselves, the Chicaza 
warriors held the Spanish at a severe disadvantage. Even the Spanish chroniclers admit 
that if the Chicazans had pressed the attack “not a man of all of us would have 
escaped.”83 The Chicazans had even decided to attack again, but a rain prevented them 
from executing this planned attack.84 
 This refusal to attack a second time can be explained in one of two ways. The 
least likely and most speculative explanation is that the Chicaza did not attack because 
the rain would have prevented their use of fire. The second and most likely explanation is 
that this rain represented a negative omen for the Chicaza warriors. Mississippian 
warriors were a highly spiritual group that had very particular war rituals. Before going 
into battle warriors would congregate with the head War Chief and fast for a period of 
days drinking only potions. Hudson notes in his groundbreaking work The Southeastern 
Indians several examples of omens, but I will simply use two. One example deals with 
the consolation of crystals. If the crystal failed to sparkle in the sunlight when a warrior 
passed that individual was sent home. Another example of ritual that warriors had to 
follow dealt with movements while on the offensive. Native warriors were not allowed to 
lean on trees or sit on the ground directly. If a man broke a twig he was required to carry 
it until nightfall. If warriors failed to follow these rules then that warrior would be sent 
home or the attack would be called off.85 
 The Battle of Chicaza was more detrimental to the Spanish than the Battle of 
Mabila due to the loss of horses. As previously stated, the horse provided the Spanish 
with one of their greatest military advantages, as seen at the battle of Napituca and the 																																																								
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field around Mabila. While only twelve horses were lost at Mabila, some fifty horses 
were lost as a result of the fire that swallowed the town at Chicaza, taking away several 
of the Spaniards’ greatest military assets.86 The course of the battle also shows a 
breakdown in command. De Soto had warned his troops to be ready for battle, but fatigue 
and weariness and a growing disdain for their commander kept them from following such 
an order, which subsequently caused many of the Spanish to flee their encampment 
unprepared. The Chicaza warriors used darkness to their advantage, implementing a night 
raid against the Spanish, but also using the Spaniard’s fatigue against them. The Chicaza 
warriors tried to attack the Spanish again several days later in similar fashion, but this 
time the Spanish were prepared and routed the Chicazans, who did not attempt another 
attack.87 
 The final battle that I will look at is the battle of the Alibamo fort. After leaving 
Chicaza, the Spanish headed northwest. De Soto had sent some troops ahead on the 
previous day to look for supplies. Juan de Añasco discovered a fort across a pathway 
backed by a stream, supposedly manned by 300 warriors.88 Añasco decided that attacking 
his position with such a small force was a bad idea, so he sent for De Soto and awaited 
reinforcements. The Spanish, it should be noted, waited in a specific defensive formation 
to protect the horses in their contingent. The Spanish stood in front of their horses and, 
using their shields, blocked any arrows from hitting the horses.89  
 The position and intention of this fort is rather curious. There are no other 
examples of its kind in the chronicles. Today we know that Mississippian chiefdoms 
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would have made such a stand to prove their might against an opponent, but the way in 
which that was demonstrated here is different. The fort had low doorways that were 
possibly intentional to prevent the Spanish horses from gaining entrance. Once inside the 
fort the Spanish realized that there were not only no houses in this fortification, but also 
no food. This suggests that the Alibamo had built this fort for the sole purpose of 
challenging the Spanish. Ethnohistorian Robbie Ethridge suggests that the Alibamo knew 
about the Spanish and may have participated in the battle at Chicaza.90 The Battle at the 
Alibamo Fort occurred on April 28, 1541.91 Once De Soto arrived he used the same tactic 
he employed at Mabila, except instead of four squads he only used three. The difference 
here of course is that instead of having to fight through one palisade there were two. 
After the Alibamo had been pushed from the second wall, they escaped across a small 
footbridge over which the Spanish could not follow because they could not cross it with 
their horses.92  
The Battle of the Alibamo Fort was a strategic mistake for the Spanish, given the 
loss of life and because the battle could have been avoided altogether. The Alibamo had 
successfully shown they could challenge the Spanish. The fort was a defensive ploy used 
to draw the Spanish in. There is no way of knowing exactly what the intentions of the 
Alibamo Indians were, but what they accomplished is remarkable. Using the advantage of 
the double walls of the fort they managed to kill more Spanish than the Spanish could 
afford to lose. De Soto lost about eight men in the initial fighting and another fifteen or so 
afterwards from wounds.93 De Soto made the mistake of engaging this force when it 
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would have been possible to bypass this fortification completely by simply going in a 
different direction. However, De Soto would not have his honor in question nor would he 
turn down a challenge. These losses were not necessary, and the Spanish gained nothing. 
One can only imagine De Soto’s frustration when the Native warriors fled across the 
footbridge, leaving the Spanish behind in an empty fort. After leaving Chicaza, the 
expedition continued north and eventually crossed the Mississippi river (see Figure 1) 
and headed into present day-Arkansas and Texas. As it became apparent that they would 
find no riches and as manpower began to dwindle, the expedition turned around towards 
the Mississippi River to float down to Mexico.  
 The aftermath left by De Soto and his troops disrupted much about the 
Mississippian world. As Ethridge puts it, “the Soto expedition cut a swath through the 
entire Mississippian world, destabilizing many chiefdoms and thus making regional 
readjustments and recovery difficult.”94 When later Europeans came through the 
Southeast in the seventeenth century, nothing came close to the majesty seen by 
Hernando De Soto. De Soto’s expedition destabilized the region, and it brought European 
diseases into the Southeast. Spanish pigs could have carried a multitude of diseases 
including brucellosis, anthrax, and trichinosis.95 The Spanish eventually made it to 
Mexico under the leadership of Moscoso, after De Soto’s death west of the Mississippi 
River to sickness,96 but with only about one-third the original force they started with and 
in far worse condition. The Spanish eventually returned and established Catholic 
missions in Florida, but the fundamental transformation of Native life in the region 																																																								
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occurred when the Dutch, French, and English incorporated indigenous people in the 
growing global economy through trade of Indian slaves and firearms in the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries.97 
 When looking at these battles over the course of the expedition, a few key points 
emerge. The Spanish maintained the tactics they knew over the course of the expedition, 
using formations and their horses when they could. The Native groups did the same – 
they employed indigenous tactics and strategies of warfare to confront the Spanish. 
Certain Native groups like the Alibamo, however, seemingly modified their tactics after 
learning about Spanish strategies. By building a decoy fort, they were able to trick the 
Spanish and inflict heavy casualties.   The Natives chose whether to use guerrilla tactics 
or formal battles for reasons we may never know. Since we only have archaeological 
evidence of Native American cultures, such as the temple mounds, from the people 
themselves it is impossible to know for sure what their intentions were in these battles. 
However, ethnohistory does help shed light on this issue, specifically that Native warriors 
desired to minimalize casualties in war.  
 Overall the expedition of Hernando De Soto was a failure for the Spanish, 
because De Soto did not accomplish his goal of finding riches or establishing a 
permanent colony. Militarily, the expedition had some success, but in many cases these 
events could have gone either way. There were several pivotal moments when the 
Spanish had the advantage, but change a few details and the end result could have been 
different. Conversely, the Native people lost against the Spanish by miscalculations, poor 
tactical decisions, or simply not having the ability or technology to compete with the 
Spanish. Ultimately they were successful, however, at driving the Spanish out and 																																																								
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delaying Spanish colonization of the Southeast for several generations. The next segment 
in this examination of military history will take us to the American Northeast over a 
century later where the Wampanoags and their allies fought for their sovereignty against 
English colonists. 
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Chapter II 
King Philip's War: 
1675-1676 
The American Northeast did not develop into an English foothold on North 
America through peaceful action. King Philip’s War, fought from the summer of 1675 
until the autumn of 1676, shaped the English colonial experience in the seventeenth 
century. The combatants in this war consisted of several New England Indian tribes, 
including the Nipmuc, Narragansett, and Wampanoag on the side of King Philip, and the 
English settlements of Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay Colony, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island. The English also employed the help of Native allies including the Pequot 
and Mohegan. In terms of the percentage of the population killed, King Philip's War was 
the bloodiest war ever fought on American soil. For the English some 1,538 men per 
every 100,000 were killed. The Indians lost 15,000 per every 100,000.98 Through King 
Philip’s War we can glean an understanding about the status of military tactics and 
strategy in this area of the Eastern Woodlands in the late seventeenth century. During the 
war, the English learned about the effectiveness of Indian warfare the hard way. Despite 
countless victories in battle, however, the Native Americans who followed Philip 
ultimately lost the war because the English outlasted their guerrilla tactics and used their 
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own Native allies and abundant resources to make up for their lack in successful 
offensive strategies. 
The land on which King Philip's war was fought looks very different today than it 
did nearly 250 years ago. Much of New England was heavy forest or swamp with only 
sporadic English settlements apart from the busy centers like Boston or Plymouth. As 
Edmund Leach puts it, "Here and there the monotonous wilderness was broken by a few 
acres of cleared land and a small cluster of houses--a village set down in the middle of 
the forest."99 Unlike campaigns fought in Europe, the battles of King Philip’s War did not 
take place in open fields, but in swamps, forests, and small portions of cleared land. This 
terrain helped conceal Indian combatants, much to the English's disappointment since 
they were not yet accustomed to fighting in such heavy forest. The swampy areas also 
provided much needed cover from English eyes. The placement of a hill or forest is 
important to the progression of a fight. The landscape of New England then affected the 
strategic decisions made by both sides as the conflict progressed. 
																																																								
99 Edmund Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War (New York: The 
MacMillian Company, 1958), 7.	
	41	
 
Figure 2: Map of King Philip’s War. Source: James D. Drake, King Philip's War: Civil War in 
New England, 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), x. 
The events that led to the outbreak of King Philip's War spanned many years. The 
death of Philip's father, Massasoit, laid the groundwork for the war. Massasoit died in 
1662 after forty-one years of peace with the English. With the death of Massasoit, the 
leadership fell on his two sons Wamsutta and Metacom, whom Massasoit had given the 
English names Alexander and Philip respectively. Wamsutta, the oldest son, inherited the 
sachemship. However, under mysterious circumstances, Wamsutta died that same year 
after the English summoned him to Plymouth to put to rest rumors that the Wampanoags 
had made an alliance with the Narragansetts against the English. Wamusutta initially 
refused the summons, but Majors Josiah Winslow and William Bradford went to obtain 
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him.100 After giving the English a "satisfactory” explanation, Wamsutta became very ill 
while staying with Winslow.101 Some of the Indians feared he had been poisoned, but the 
conditions of his death are still up for debate. The rumors that their leader had died at the 
hands of the English put the Wampanoags on edge. Tensions increased over the next 
decade after Wamsutta’s brother, Metacom—or, as the English called him, King Philip—
assumed the sachemship.  
There are two other items that played an important role in the years before the 
war: land grabbing and advances by other European powers. The English in New 
England experienced their first population boom in the 1630s and 1640s, which left many 
people wanting for land over the next twenty years. These settlers were willing to acquire 
land by almost any means necessary, including finding sachems that were willing to sell 
land that they technically did not own, because Indian lands were communal. Once the 
English had “bought” this land they imposed fines on the Indians still living there until 
they were forced to leave.102 
Over the next thirteen years, the Wampanoags under Philip were involved in two 
war scares, both of which put the English on high alert. The first came in 1667 and the 
second came in 1671. In 1667 a Wampanoag under the direction of Niantic sachem 
Ninigret spread a message to Plymouth that Philip had been secretly planning a war 
against the English.103 The presence of other European powers including the Dutch in 
New York and French in Canada led to this war scare.104 The English feared having to 
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face not only Native Americans on the frontier, but also the Dutch and the French in the 
event that a war between European powers occurred. Fears of attack and uncertainty 
about the future put the English colonies on edge. Philip, in this instance, managed to 
assure the English that no such plan was being made, through peaceful negotiations. Then 
in 1671 the leaders of the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies were notified by one 
Hugh Cole of Swansea that the Narragansett and Wampanoag were readying for war. 
This incident led to the signing of the Taunton Agreement, which forced Philip to confess 
to planning an attack and to hand over his firearms. Historians Michael Tougias and Eric 
Schultz argue that Philip signed this treaty simply to appease the English.105 
Of the English involved, there are two individuals I want to introduce: Benjamin 
Church and Josiah Winslow. Church wrote a memoir, Diary of King Philip’s War, which 
chronicled his experiences during the war. Winslow served as a prominent commander 
and played an important role during the Narragansett campaign. The most important 
Indian leader is, of course, Metacom or King Philip. A Wampanoag from the Mount 
Hope Peninsula in Narrugansett Bay, Philip orchestrated most of the Native war effort. 
Although we know the names of several of his lieutenants including Totoson and 
Tuspaquin, the lack of Native written records leaves most of their lives in a historical fog. 
Benjamin Church was a frontiersman who was born in Plymouth in 1639 and later 
settled in Little Compton in 1674.106 Church had been a friend of the Indians, and on 
several occasions he attempted to persuade them against fighting the English. Before the 
outset of hostilities, Church had even tried to win the loyalty of the female sachem, 
Awashonks, of the Sakonnets, and Weetamoo of the Pocassets to keep them from 																																																								
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fighting on the side of Philip.107 After the war, Church sold land to Indians with the 
promise that they would not be sold into slavery.108 Church played an important role in 
several campaigns and engagements. He participated in the Mount Hope Campaign, the 
Narragansett Campaign, the Battle of Almy's Pease Field, and the Great Swamp Fight.  
Church's memoir is one of the most important firsthand accounts of the war. 
Written more than thirty years after the ending of hostilities, Church relayed his 
memories of the events from his beginning discussions with Awashonks and ending with 
the capture of Philip's last captain Tuspaquin. The account reveals much about English 
and Indian tactics. Church focused on the English side of battles, but often gave credit to 
Indian abilities. Church died on January 17, 1718.109 As far as any of the sources tell, 
Church had no previous military experience before King Philipf battles, but often gave 
credit to Indian abilities. Church died on January 17, 1718110 
Josiah Winslow became one of the most important military commanders of the 
war. At the outbreak of the conflict, Winslow was the Governor of Plymouth Colony.111 
As governor, Winslow had been involved in events that led directly to King Philip’s War. 
In particular, King Philip’s brother, Alexander, had died while under the care of 
Winslow; the Indians later accused Winslow of murder. During the war, Winslow was 
the commander of the United Colonies forces at the Narragansett Swamp Fort. His 
leadership and decision-making in the campaign are important to understanding the 
English side of the war because of his use of English command chains and tactics. Like 
many of these English commanders, Winslow had no real combat experience. Most of his 																																																								
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positions had been in the Plymouth colonial government before he became governor. His 
governorship is what allowed him to lead men into combat. 
There are a few other English names that deserve mention for their contributions 
to the war effort. First is Major Samuel Moseley, who was known for his hatred of the 
Indians. The feeling appeared mutual, for during the Great Swamp fight the Indians 
supposedly fired entirely at Moseley, but missed every shot.112 Other individuals 
important to the war effort included Majors Thomas Savage and Samuel Appleton. Major 
Savage fought in various campaigns throughout the war, including the Mount Hope 
Campaign and campaigns into the Connecticut River Valley in 1676. Major Samuel 
Appleton was placed in charge of troops in Western Massachusetts after Captains 
Lathrop and Beers were caught and killed in deadly ambushes. Appleton was also one of 
Winslow’s subordinate officers during the Great Swamp fight.113  
Major Moseley had formal military experience as a seaman. Before 1668, 
Moseley had been a privateer in the Caribbean. In the years between 1668 and 1674 
Moseley fought against Dutch pirates plaguing the New England coast.114Appleton and 
Savage did not have any previous fighting experience, but had roles in colonial 
leadership. Savage served as captain of the 2nd Boston militia company from 1652 to 
1682.115 Appleton served as deputy to the General court from 1668-1671 and served 
under his brotherl leadership. Savage served as captain of the 2 1668 an116 For the many 
men, including Church and Winslow, in New England who had not served in any military 
capacity in the mother country, the local muster days required by colonial authority were 																																																								
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the only military experience they had. This meant that while they had some minimum 
training in traditional English volley firing lines, they had little real combat experience.117 
Philip, the Wampanoag leader who led the Native forces, had made the best of a 
terrible situation since the beginning of his sachemship. In the thirteen years leading up to 
the war, Philip took substantial measures to prevent open conflict by suppressing the war 
scares that had occurred in 1667 and 1671. Due to mounting English pressures on 
Wampanoag land and heated young warriors who were eager to fight, however, Philip’s 
efforts to keep the peace were to no avail. This issue aside, Philip was a great leader 
when it came to persuading other tribes to join in the fight against the English, though he 
did not have the controlling power of someone like Winslow or the United Colonies. 
Philip, although he forged alliances with the Narragansett and Nipmunk Indians, was 
never in direct control of their forces. Unlike the English, the New England Indians held 
a decentralized government system. Whereas Josiah Winslow had the opportunity to lead 
the United Colonies, Philip did not have a similar opportunity. Calling Philip a king is a 
misnomer. The English equated him to king because of the alliances he was able to build, 
but Philip had no real control over his allies. 
There existed two distinct differences between Indian and English rule and 
government structure. Although the individual colonies had their own independent 
institutions and laws much like individual tribes, they respond to the war very differently. 
When the colonies became unified and elected a central leader, Josiah Winslow, he had 
absolute control over those underneath him. King Philip could influence tribes near him 
to join against the English, which he did so successfully, but Philip had no totalitarian 																																																								
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control over his allies including the Nipmucs. This also transitioned into tactical and 
strategic leadership. Philip and other Indian chiefs encouraged others to fight with them, 
but if a group wanted to leave or attack a different target they were free to do so.118 
English soldiers did not have such a luxury. 
Philip was about twenty-three when he became sachem and within thirteen years 
he became part of one of the deadliest wars to ever touch North American soil. Somewhat 
ironically Philip was ultimately shot and killed by an Indian ally of the English on his 
home peninsula.119 The historical depictions of Philip's personality vary. While European 
contemporaries tended to paint him as a treacherous rabble-rouser, historians see him 
differently. According to historian George Bodge, Philip maintained the loyalty of his 
allies through fear instead of love, but Bodge also denotes him as a great leader and 
alliance-builder. Bodge claimed that he was the ablest at visiting distant tribes and 
convincing other leaders to his cause.120 Daniel Mandell portrays King Philip in a much 
more humanistic light. Mandell presents Philip as a leader under pressure. The English 
were constantly afraid of Indian attacks, which caused them to constantly subvert Native 
sovereignty. Philip did his best to hold his tribe together and maintain a somewhat neutral 
relationship with the English. However, faced with mounting accusations by the English, 
specifically Plymouth Colony, Philip was forced to make the fateful decision to go to war 
to protect his land.121 
With one exception, there is not much known in detail about Philip's lieutenants, 
other than where they came from, familial relations to Philip if they existed, and where 																																																								
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they might have fought. Some of his more important lieutenants or fellow war chiefs 
were Muttawmp and Totoson. When the Narragansetts joined the war they were led by 
the sachem Canonchet. There is ample discussion of Canonchet in the historical record, 
but most of it deals with his negotiations with the English at the beginning of the 
Narragansett Campaign and his eventual execution.122 The military background of the 
other commanders varies. The Narragansett Indians had some experience fighting the 
Mohegans in the 1640s when Mohegan sachem Uncas helped the United Colonies topple 
a Narragansett sachem for wanting to reject English ways.123 For the Wampanoags, 
Muttawmp and Totoson, their specific military experience is unknown, however it is 
reasonable to assume that these men were experienced in the tribal warfare. Tribal 
warfare typically consisted of ambushes and raids, usually in small parties. In indigenous 
warfare, eliminating the enemy entirely was not the objective. Previous to the large-scale 
acquirement of firearms by the Indians, Native people engaged in near continuous small-
scale warfare with their neighbors. The English complained about this supposedly 
limitless fighting, in particular because of the so-called “skulking” method of ambush 
attacks that Indians employed as a way to prevent excessive loss of life.124 It was not until 
the New England tribes encountered the English that they learned the ways of mass 
killing in warfare.125  
The weapons of war played just as important a role in the conflict as the men that 
fought in it. By the time of King Philip's War, Native tribes had already been trading with 
Europeans for firearms. The first firearms traded were matchlocks. Yet, according to 
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historian James Drake, the New England Indians continued to use bows and arrows, 
which were often more accurate than the early matchlock guns.126 Indian men were 
partial to the flintlock musket, which became available from Dutch traders around 1660, 
although both guns were available for trade.127 The flintlock was lighter compared to 
other firearms at the time, like the matchlock, and thus more suitable for hunting 
expeditions and raids through the heavily forested landscape of New England. The 
flintlock used a clasp to hold onto a piece of flint, which struck a metal pad that produced 
a spark that ignited the charge.128 This allowed for a quicker spark and the person firing 
the gun did not have to worry about a match going out. 
At the beginning of the war, the English used the matchlock in combat because it 
was the regulation weapon at the time. The matchlock rifle is more cumbersome than its 
flintlock relative. Instead of using a piece of flint, the matchlock rifle uses a lighted fuse 
or match to ignite the powder.129 The matchlock also used a stand in order to stabilize the 
fire. Soldiers needed this stabilizer to get maximum accuracy, for the typical manner of 
English warfare was to form battle lines from which to fire back and forth. The 
matchlock was heavier than the flintlock, so in order to get an accurate line of fire the 
stand was required. Nimble Indians with flintlocks were much harder targets than English 
with standing matchlocks, and well before the war’s end, the English were also using 
flintlocks.130 
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Melee weapons also played an important role in the conflict. Native combatants at 
close range used wooden clubs, wooden cutlasses, and the quintessential tomahawk. 
Indian clubs or cutlasses were hand-made, and although there was a common style, the 
maker’s work varied.131 In close quarter combat these weapons, although not steel, were 
no less deadly. The English had a slightly less variable array of melee weapons. The 
English used their own sabers in battle; these swords were much more uniform than an 
Indian club or cutlass. The other common English melee weapon was the pike. Pikes 
were long spears or pole-arms used to dismount or discourage cavalry attacks. The pike, 
however, was abandoned early on in the war due to its uselessness in fighting pedestrian 
Indians. The mobility of Native warriors and the fact that they did not have cavalry units 
made the pike a "pointless" addition to the war effort. The English at this point did not 
use bayonets.132 
In 1675 the murder trial of the Christian Indian John Sassamon was the final event 
that lead directly to the opening of the conflict. Sassamon was a Christian Indian who 
was found murdered under the ice of Assowamset Swamp.133 Christian Indians were 
loyal to the English and later became great assets to the English during the war. The 
expansion of Christianity among Natives was seen as an expansion of colonial power that 
undermined Native sovereignty.134 The English brought three Wampanoag Indians to trial 
for Sassamonli murder. The men were convicted and sentenced to hang. One, 
Wampapaquin, survived the hanging when the rope broke, but he was shot within a 
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month.135  Since the Wampanoag were a sovereign nation this trial violated their rights to 
punish or not punish their own tribal people. The English colonies did not have Philip’s 
permission to do this. This execution of Wampanoag Indians pushed the warriors over the 
edge and led to the opening bloodshed. Lastly, there was a series of astronomical events 
including arrow shaped comets and strange northern lights that some English and Natives 
believed foretold the coming war.136  
The trial of Sassamonl  supposed killers was the last straw. The mounting English 
pressures for assurances of peace since the death of Metacomed brother Wamsutta 
coupled with their demands for land and the coloniescolonies coloniesor assurances of 
peace since the death of ening bloodSassamon trial was taken as a great grievance by the 
Wampanoag and was an affront to their sovereignty. It also meant that ignoring the 
English threat to Native sovereignty was no longer an option.137 A few days before the 
attack on Swansea, the deputy governor of Rhode Island John Easton held a rushed 
meeting with King Philip, in an attempt to dissuade the Wampanoags from attacking the 
other colonies. Philip addressed his grievances, but it was too little too late. Philip wanted 
to the English to respect the Indians as his father, Massosoit, had done with the first 
English settlers, but the English would not.138 War had come. 
On June 20, 1675, hostilities began when a group of Pokanoket Indians harassed 
the town of Swansea.139 Swansea was an English frontier town at the entrance of Philip’s 
home, the Mount Hope Peninsula (see Figure 2).140 No English were killed in this initial 																																																								
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attack, because the Indians believed that the side that spilled first blood would lose. The 
English spilled the first blood three days later on June 23, 1675, when a young boy shot 
and mortally wounded a Wampanoag warrior.141 The Wampanoags retaliated by killing 
nine English men the following day.142 With this shot all hopes of peace were shattered 
for both the English and Philip’s supporters. Unfortunately for the New England Indians, 
the prophesy of first blood did not come true. 
The first major English campaign of the war was the Mount Hope campaign in 
June-August of 1675, just a few days after the attack on Swansea. This was the opening 
of organized warfare for the United Colonies. Forces were sent by Massachusetts and 
Plymouth into Swansea piecemeal, but the force that eventually gathered was large 
consisting of companies under command of Captains Cudworth, Prentice, Savage, 
Moseley and Church.143 This campaign was designed to keep Philip isolated on the 
Mount Hope Peninsula and end the "Indian uprising" before it started.  
Troops from both the Plymouth and Massachusetts colonies planned on sweeping 
the Mount Hope Peninsula and to kill or capture Philip in the process. By the time the 
English forces actually managed to approach Philip's village, however, most of the 
Indians had crossed the bay to the Poccassett Coast. There was only a small skirmish 
towards the end of this sweep. About twelve Indians or so waited in ambush and fired 
upon the advancing English.144 The English suffered one casualty in this skirmish. The 
English had expected Philip to stand and fight, but Indian warfare was of a different sort 
than they knew. The English wanted to engage in open field combat, but Native warriors 
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preferred to use guerilla tactics to attack their enemy. Although the English saw Philip’s 
retreat as cowardly, this retreat followed standard rules of war in Native eyes. Philip was 
saving manpower to fight another day. After Philip’s retreat from the Mount Hope 
Peninsula the campaign spread to the Pocasset Swamp, where the English caught the 
Wampanoags off guard on the first of August. The Wampanoags retreated further into the 
swamp, and when the English decided to pursue the Indians had already made their 
escape.145 
The Mount Hope Campaign was a failure for one key reason. The English were 
cautious in their approach to the peninsula, which gave King Philip ample time to retreat 
across the bay.  One potentially beneficial outcome, but ultimately a waste of time, was 
the building of a fort in the event that Philip would ever return.146  Philip did return, but 
not until close to the wareason. The English were cautious in their approach to the 
peninsula, which gave King Philip ample time to retreat across the bay.147 The strategic 
benefits of a defensive strategy vary from better positioning to stronger supply lines and 
hopefully less loss of life. However, in the case of this campaign the English did not reap 
such benefits. The defensive strategy allowed the Indians to roam about the countryside 
raiding English villages. Church, after some argument, was given permission to track 
Indians on the Pocassett coast. As a result Church and his men found themselves 
involved at the Battle of Almyst Pease Field.   
While the English were busy sweeping the area around Mount Hope and Pocasset 
Coast, the New England Natives were beginning attacks on English villages. This 
campaign or series of raids does not have a formal designation, so I will refer to it as the 																																																								
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First Indian Offensive, which occurred from June until December 1675. This offensive 
consisted of a series of raids and attacks on frontier settlements. Some of the battles that 
took place during this phase of the war include Bloody Brook, Beers’ Ambush, and the 
Attack on Mendon. Attacks during this offensive were led by both Philip’s Wampanoag 
and his Nipmuc allies.148 Because of the swiftness and surprise of the attacks, many of 
the places the Natives attacked were relatively undefended. The English, still ignorant to 
Indian tactics, were caught in unaware, and therefore unable to adequately defend their 
villages. When they attempted a defense, they were often caught in deadly ambushes.  
This offensive is important to note because it exemplifies important aspects to 
Native warfare. Native American raids and ambushes were integral to warfare. Historian 
Patrick Malone notes that each served its own purpose and that both required intense 
preparation and tactical planning. Ambushes and raids both required stealth and 
concealment to be implemented properly. If warriors were seen before the attack they lost 
a crucial advantage. Raids were conducted against static targets such as villages. 
Ambushes were used to catch moving enemies and at times Natives would lead their 
enemies into preplanned locations.149 The English suffered in attacks such as these 
several times, including a renewed offensive in the spring of 1676. Still, it took the 
United Colonies several months before making the appropriate adjustments to this type of 
warfare.  
The Battle of Almy’s Pease Field, witnessed by Captain Benjamin Church, was 
fought in July of 1675. The major player in this battle was Church who, after the Mount 
Hope campaign, as we have seen, set out to the Pocasset coast in order to purse Philip’s 																																																								
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forces. After Church landed on the Pocasset coast, he advanced forward with Captain 
Matthew Fuller plus thirty-six men.150 After spending the night in camp, Church and 
Fuller split into two teams. Fuller retreated after a brief skirmish with Wampanoag 
forces, while Church headed south.151 Church's troops discovered Indian tracks and began 
to follow. However, rattlesnakes forced them to take a route that led them past Almy's 
field.152 
As the men approached Almy's Pease Field they saw two Indians. Church tried to 
speak with them, but the Indians ran, firing a few parting shots with their flintlocks. An 
English soldier returned in kind. The Indians fled across the field, with the English 
following them. When the English reached the far side of the field "they were saluted 
with a volley of fifty or sixty guns."153 The Natives had caught the English in an ambush. 
The English took refuge behind a fence where they stacked stones for extra protection 
and remained there until ships under the command of Captain Goulding rescued them. 
Another boat had come before Goulding, but came under such heavy fire from the 
Indians that it retreated.154 
From the standpoint of the English, Captain Church did an incredible job keeping 
his wits about him and his troops. It stands to reason that if Church could have convinced 
the rest of the English to pursue the Indians that a much larger battle would have taken 
place. Church was also lucky to have had an English sloop come so close to his location. 
If the point of the Mount Hope Campaign and by extension this excursion onto the 
Pocasset coast was to end the war before it started, pursuing the Indians across the water 																																																								
150 Church, Diary of King Philip's War, 81-83. 
151 Schultz, Tougias, King Philip's War: The History of America's Forgotten Conflict, 239. 
152 Church, Diary of King Philip's War, 82.	
153 Church, Diary of King Philip's War, 84. 
154 Church, Diary of King Philip's War, 84-89. 
	56	
would seem to have been the more potent option as opposed to building a fort. Yet, we 
should not be surprised by this fact. The English still had it in their minds to defeat Philip 
in open combat; to this end a fort simply made more sense. 
The Native perspective of this fight is relatively unknown. Most likely Almy’s 
Pease field was a planned ambush as Native forces often used. The two Indians that fled 
across the field were decoys sent to lure the English into this trap. Although not a single 
Englishman died during this fight, the Native force managed to force the English into a 
retreat.155 The few casualties suffered in this battle demonstrate the inaccuracy of early 
firearms. There are of course several variables, including distance, wind speed, and 
thickness of cover that could affect a firearm’s performance, but we have no information 
on the specifics on those variables. One aspect to note was the Indian’s use of terrain. 
Church noted their use of natural cover: “Indians, who possessed themselves of every 
rock, stump, tree, or fence that was in sight.”156 The Indian force took every advantage 
they could from the terrain.  
The next organized campaign came in the winter of 1675 into 1676. The 
Narragansett had made promises to stay on the side of the English during the war. 
Historically, the Narragansett and Wampanoag were enemies so they had no reason to 
become allies at the beginning of the conflict. The English and the Narragansett had 
signed several treaties together, and on October 18, 1675, the Narragansett signed a treaty 
stating that they would give up any Wampanoag who came to them seeking shelter. This 
was an extension of a treaty of peace that had been signed in July of the same year. The 
original treaty signed in July was not done so in complete cooperation. The United 																																																								
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Colonies sent a small army to show strength and forced several Narragansett chiefs to 
sign.157 The extension came with a clarification of when the Wampanoag captives were to 
be delivered to Boston: October 28 of the same year.158 However, the Narragansett failed 
to deliver any captives. 
When the Commissioners of the United Colonies realized that they were not 
going to receive the Wampanoag prisoners as promised, they needed to determine their 
next move. Although we do not know why the Narragansett refused to give up the 
Wampanoags in their midst, Mandell provides an adequate cultural explanation. Mandell 
states that, tas the United Colonies’ deadline to turn over Wampanoags approached, tribal 
leaders made it clear that they would not betray their traditional obligations to kinfolk and 
rules of hospitality.s159 Presumably, the Narragansetts had adopted some of their 
Wampanoag captives and now considered them family members protected by the rules of 
kinship. The English felt that they needed to enforce the stipulations of the treaty, and on 
November 12, 1675, the English decided to invade Narragansett country and do just 
that.160 The English, despite having had good relationships with the Narragansett Indians, 
did not trust them altogether. In 1669, for example, the Narragansett sachem Ninigret had 
prompted a war scare in the colonies by attending an Indian dance with the anti-English 
Mohegans.161 The English now feared a Narrangansett and Wampanoag alliance. The 
only way for the English to deter such an alliance, they believed, was through a show of 
force.  
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Similar to the Mount Hope Campaign, the Narragansett Campaign had a slow 
start, but not without purpose. Even though this campaign was fought in the winter 
months, which posed difficulties for the English in maintaining supplies, the initial issues 
that delayed the campaign were not due to weather. The campaign took over a month to 
prepare for including gathering supplies, gaining political accommodations from the 
Rhode Island Colony, and transporting troops from one location to another. The United 
Colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut needed accommodation from 
Rhode Island, because the Narrangansett lived within the borders of the Rhode Island 
Colony. Rhode Island agreed to allow the United Colonies access to its land and sent its 
own troops for support.162 The campaign officially began on December 8, 1675, when 
Governor Winslow took command of the army and ordered the advance.163  
The English first engaged in a few skirmishes with the Narragansett, including 
several raids. During these raids the English took several captives and sold them into 
slavery. Even Church, who arrived in Rhode Island before Winslow, partook in these 
activities.164 The English justified the taking of slaves for several reasons including those 
grounded in scripture and international law. The most pressing justification was a 
monetary one. The selling of slaves gave the colonies much needed revenue for the 
growing war effort.165 On December 18, the Connecticut forces finally joined the forces 
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in Rhode Island and under the guide of a "friend Indian" named Peter Freeman, the 
English advanced towards the Narragansett Fort the next day.166 
Peter Freeman led the English to the Narraganset Fort on December 19, 1675. 
Peter Freeman was a Narragansett Indian that had supposedly turned against his people to 
help the English.167 The place where he led the English on the fort had a small opening 
over which a single log lay. The fighting at this opening was very brutal. At first English 
units under Captains Davenport and Johnson, then units under Moseley and Gardiner, 
were sent in piecemeal to attack the Narragansett and were repulsed by Indian defenders. 
Davenport and Johnson were killed and Gardiner was mortally wounded.168 After these 
failures the English units under Major Appleton and Captain Oliver made an “impetuous 
assault” for the breach and broke through defenses into the fort and managed to take one 
of the flanking houses.169 Once the English gained entry into the fort, many Indians began 
firing from their wigwams. After the English took control of the fort they began setting 
fire to the wigwams, but Winslow ordered a tactical retreat, which left the fort to be 
retaken by the Narragansett. Since Winslow had ordered the wigwams and the corn stores 
to be burned, the English could not stay without proper supplies. They returned to their 
winter camps to wait out the cold weather with new troops and supplies brought in from 
the coastline. 
This famous fort was built by the Narragansett in a European style, but the date of 
its construction is unknown. This implies that the Native groups had learned from the 
English long before the war broke out. More importantly the fort was built in the swamp, 
																																																								
166 Ellis, Morris, King Philip's War, 145-150. 
167 Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 126. 
168 Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, 187. 
169 Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 187.	
	60	
in which the English had troubles fighting.170 The fort had walls of high stakes 
surrounded by several feet of brush and tree limbs encompassing some five or six acres. 
The fort also contained blockhouses from which the Narragansett could fire upon the 
English.171 Once the English obtained entry and were joined by their full force, the 
Indians took to their wigwams for protection. Sources state that these wigwams were 
bulletproof due to a large quantity of grain stored in tubs along the walls.172 Fighting at 
this point was step by step, Indians from their wigwams and the English from whatever 
point of defense they could find. Fortunately for the English, but disastrous for the 
Narragansett, the Narragansett ran out of powder, which forced them to resort to their 
bows and arrows towards the end of the battle.173 Typically speaking this would not have 
been too much of an issue for the Narragansett since they were skilled bowmen, but by 
the time the Indians ran out of powder the English had already began to set fire to the fort 
and the Narragansett did not have the manpower in the fort to ward off the English.  
There are some additional details that need to be addressed. The Great Swamp 
fight was the largest and bloodiest battle of King Philip's War. General Winslow took a 
combined force of some 1,000 men deep into Narragansett territory in the winter of 1675. 
This army was composed of 527 men from Massachusetts, 159 men from Plymouth, and 
300 soldiers from Connecticut, plus officers. The last 150 were Mohegan allies 
accompanying the Connecticut forces.174  Winslow was the supreme commander-in-chief 
followed by the commanders of the colonial regiments: Samuel Appleton for 
Massachusetts, William Bradford for Plymouth, and Robert Treat for Connecticut. Rhode 																																																								
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Island did not have a regimental commander. Each regiment, including Winslow had a 
support staff. Lastly, each company contained a captain or major, lieutenant, and sergeant 
or ensign.175 The preparation for this army took some time, but after about a month the 
force finally advanced on Narragansett territory. The battle ended in an English victory 
with the English suffering 210 casualtiesand the Narragansetts losing between 150 and 
300 men.176  The total number of Narragansetts at the fort is unknown. The Narragansetts 
also lost a sizable portion of their winter food stores and the English took captive many 
Native women, children, and old people.177  
Although the Great Swamp fight was a success for the English, it could have been 
a different story. Historians Schultz and Tougias make three astute points, which question 
Canonchetee tactics and strategy. Their first point is that if the Narragansett had harassed 
the English army before reaching the fort, the English forces would have been weakened 
by the time they reached the stronghold. Canonchet, the Indian leader at the fort, could 
have surprised the English at several points along their march. The second tactical failure 
was the lack of a flanking maneuver during the battle itself. Canonchet could have used a 
flanking maneuver from outside the fort to weaken the English position. The last tactical 
failure of Canonchet comes during the English retreat.178 Once Winslow and his forces 
retreated from the fort they were left unmolested until late January, more than a month 
after the battle. The reasoning behind Canonchetsl decision to wait so long to attack 
confront the English, is unknown, but it is reasonable to suggest that Canonchet needed to 
resupply and rest his warriors after such a devastating defeat. In late January the 
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Narragansett decided to begin their reprisal. Winslow wanted to confront them in open 
combat, but the Narragansett knew the terrain too well, and Native forces engaged only in 
small skirmishes. Eventually these skirmishes proved to be costly for the English army 
forcing them to withdraw due to lack of resources.179  
There are two other points that I would like to address regarding Schultz and 
Tougiasre questions. First, according to historian Armstrong Starkey, Indians knew how 
to advance in blackbird fashion. A blackbird advance is when one line of men fires and 
then the next line covers the first line while they recharge their weapons.180 These skills 
undoubtedly were learned from the English colonists. In the 1650s, local Indians in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony had to attend militia-training days due to possible threats from 
the nearby Dutch.181 Although it is doubtful that Canonchet knew this specific maneuver, 
if he had it would have been beneficial to utilize a counter-maneuver. Second, as I have 
already stated, the loss of powder forced the Narragansett to use bows and arrows. It 
highly plausible that Canonchet and his warriors spent this time to resupply. In the 
decades preceding the war Natives had learned the art of not only casting bullets, but also 
repairing their own firearms.182 Yet, they still suffered from a lack of steady supplies. 
There are also some questions about what was the true purpose of the unfinished 
opening that the English used to enter the fort. The Narragansett had ample time to repair 
the minor opening in the fort. If this was not just a simple structural issue and a planned 
chokepoint for the English it worked for a time, but when the Narragansett ran out of 
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powder the English managed to push through the defenders.183 The Indians appear to 
have either underestimated their enemy or overestimated their own abilities to hold the 
fort, though I find the later most likely, possibly because of the need to prove themselves 
against the English. As far as what we know happened, the Indians defended the fort 
reasonably well by use of the chokepoint and blockhouses. Despite not having the history 
of large-scale forts like those of Europe, Native Americans adapted well to the defense of 
European forts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the use of firearms.184 
The Narragansett force is an example of this adaptation. New England Indians knew how 
to build forts and conduct sieges. Indians were already well versed in creating large-scale 
palisades, but the introduction of cannons made these obsolete. Fortunately for the 
Narragansetts the English did not have any artillery in this battle.  
After the Great Swamp fight, from an offensive standpoint the campaign was 
effectively over. For the next month until January 28, 1676, Winslow and his force sat in 
camp receiving supplies and an influx of reinforcements from the various colonies until 
the force reach some 1,400 men.185 From here Winslow and his men moved through 
Narragansett country burning villages and capturing the old and the weak, as well as 
women and children. This was a part of the English total war strategy. Similar to what the 
English had done in England’s Irish Wars and those against the Powhatan Confederacy in 
Virginia, in King Philip’s War it was a fight against the entire population.186 Many of 
these captives were sold into slavery or pressed into indentured servitude. Once the army 
reached Marlboro, Massachusetts on February 3, 1676, Winslow disbanded the army 
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allowing most units to go home, except for troops under the command of Captain 
Wadsworth.187  
Disbanding the army was a highly questionable move by Winslow. In retrospect it 
was very difficult to feed and supply an army that large, but the disbandment of the army 
left large sections of Massachusetts and Plymouth unguarded. Towns such as Lancaster 
and Sudbury were now open to attack. Winslow’s decision also calls into question the 
whole point of attacking the Narragansett to begin with. If the point of the invasion was 
to enforce the treaty signed in October and to maintain peace, the invasion was an utter 
failure, despite the success at the Narragansett Fort. By preemptively striking into 
Narragansett territory, the English forced the hand of the Narragansett into joining on the 
side of Philip. Not only that, but the prisoners they wanted--the Wampanoag refugees--
were never obtained. Instead, the English captured hundreds of Narragansett prisoners. 
Then during the spring of 1676 the Narragansett struck back with a vengeance.  
Late winter and spring of 1676 (February to April, roughly) saw a renewed Indian 
offensive. The Second Indian Offensive, as I will call it, had many similarities with the 
first. The Second Indian Offensive was writhe with ambushes and raids on English 
settlements including attacks on Lancaster and Sudbury. Indian leadership shifted during 
this offensive for two reasons. Canonchet and the Narragansett were now attacking 
settlements in retaliation for the destruction of the Narragansett Fort. The addition of the 
Narragansett only contributed to the English woes, who suffered an additional string of 
defeats at their hands. Philip on the other hand had suffered a major setback in the 
preceding winter before his return to the war. Philip had traveled north to New York 
territory in hopes of gathering more allies among the Mahicans. The English however had 																																																								
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a surprise in store for Philip. The United Colonies had reached out to New York 
Governor Andros to seek assist from the Mohawks. Andros, seeking to strengthen his 
alliance with the Mohawks, requested that they attack Philip and his men. The Mohawks 
were historically enemies of the Wampanoag and dealt Philip a serious blow by killing 
many of his men and hurting his chances at future alliances.188 
Philip also suffered a blow to his status and prestige as a war leader. Prestige and 
personal skills were a major component of Native concepts of war. A warrior’s ability to 
take captives, kill enemies, and earned them prestige. Prestige helped serve as a means of 
gathering warriors. Losing the fight against the Mohawk was enough to prevent the 
Mahicans from joining Philip, but the loss of several of his men only furthered the loss of 
his status. This loss was a turning point in the war. Philip’s Nipmuc and Narragansett 
allies were deeply upset by the events in New York.189 In contrast, the Mohawks now 
experienced a rise in prestige, not just amongst themselves, but also with the English. The 
success of their attack against Philip helped convince the English of the utility of Native 
allies. The Mohawks would soon join the war against Philip and his allies 
wholeheartedly.  
 This Second Indian Offensive also saw the beginning of the end for the Native 
war effort. This occurred for two reasons. The first was the capture and death of 
Canonchet. Canonchet was captured in early April by a combined force of English and 
Native allies. He was later executed.190 Despite continued Indian victories after 
Canonchetco death, Indian allegiances soon began to splinter. The Narragansett’s resolve 
to fight dissipated after their great leader was killed. Coupled with continued attacks from 																																																								
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the United Colonies’ Native allies and the English counter offensives in June through 
August, sachems began questioning whether the war was worth continuing.191 
The attack on Lancaster, which occurred on February 10, 1676, was one of the 
first attacks of the Second Indian Offensive. Lancaster lay west of Mount Wachusett in 
east-central Massachusetts. The attack on Lancaster is famous because it produced one of 
the great literary pieces of the day. Mary Rowlandson was captured by the Narragansett 
sachem Quannopin during the attack and for three months moved about with the 
Indians.192 She later penned an account of her captivity. Rowlandson revealed vivid 
details about the attack: "Their first coming was about sun/rising. Hearing the noise of 
some guns, we looked out: several houses were burning, and the smoke ascending to 
heaven...Some in our house were fighting for their lives, others wallowing in their blood, 
the house on fire over our heads, and the bloodey heathen ready to knock us on the head 
if we stirred out."193  
These village raids, as exemplified at Lancaster, were a quintessential battle tactic 
of New England Indians. The Indians came in under cover of early darkness or forest, set 
fire to houses and property, and then left that same day, avoiding large-scale linear fire 
lines. They fought in such a manner to maintain their element of surprise and minimize 
losses. This strategy of guerrilla warfare was something with which the English were 
painfully inexperienced.194 The English had no answer to these raiding attacks, which 
proved a major problem. Each town when under attack simply retreated into one of the 
garrison homes available to them and waited until reinforcements arrived or the Indians 																																																								
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left or they were killed. Though we cannot know for sure, it is possible that the Native 
forces were attempting to scare the English into capitulation. As Starkey puts it, “The 
goals of the Indian offensive is unclear, but since the raider did not distinguish between 
combatant and non-combatant, it was a campaign of terror.”195 
Other towns such as Medfield, Groton, and Marlborough faced similar fates as 
Lancaster.196 The amount of property destroyed by fire during these town raids was 
immense. Lancaster was almost completely leveled in this attack. Estimates are that the 
English suffered about 150,000 English pounds in property damage throughout the 
war.197 The modern equivalent would be in the millions of dollars. This destruction of 
property could have been seen as a symbolic destruction of English culture. Indians 
warriors left a note for the English after the attack on Medfield, Massachusetts. It stated, 
atesas a symbolic destruction ofost nothing but their life; you must lose your fair houses 
and cattle.”198 This statement also illustrates cultural differences between the Natives and 
the English. The Indians pointed out the material concerns of the settlers, concerns which 
had contributed to the outbreak of war in the first place as the English, sought to increase 
their territory and wealth at the expense of the region’s indigenous inhabitants. By 
destroying these towns, Indians left the English disheartened, which they hoped would 
break their will to fight.  
These raids also make a point about the use of fire by the Indians. At both 
Lancaster and Sudbury the Indians used flaming carts to destroy garrisons and houses. At 
Lancaster, they loaded up a cart filled with flax and other flammable materials and sent it 																																																								195	Starkey,	European	and	Native	Warfare,	77.	
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barreling down a hill towards the Rowlandson garrison.199 This tactic was quite effective, 
since organized fire departments were still a century away. As we saw at the Great 
Swamp battle, the English also used fire to destroy wigwams in native villages. Fire is an 
effective tool in warfare. Not only does it destroy property; it also creates confusion and 
fear.   
The Sudbury fight occurred on April 21, 1676. Sudbury lies in the eastern portion 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The previous day colonial authorities had intelligence 
of a sizable force of Indians near Mount Wachusett and sent Captain Wadsworth with 
more than fifty men to nearby Marlborough, which had been attacked on the 18th of the 
same month. However, upon learning that the Indian force was advancing on Sudbury, 
Wadsworth made a quick about-face towards the town.200 While Wadsworth was 
marching back towards Sudbury, Indian forces attacked the Deacon Hayes garrison in 
Sudbury and, although the Deacon garrison remained unburnt, they set fire to much of 
Sudbury.201 Upon hearing news of the battle at Sudbury, troops from several nearby 
towns came to reinforce the troops there, including eleven men from Concord who were 
ambushed when entering Sudbury from the north and slaughtered to one man.202 
Upon reaching Sudbury, Wadsworth pursued a group of retreating Indians, but 
was ambushed. Wadsworth and his men managed to flee to nearby Green Hill, where 
they made a stand against their enemy.203 Another group from Watertown came to the aid 
of Wadsworth, but was unable to breach through the enemy lines to the hill. Wadsworth 
and his men suffered heavy casualties, including Wadsworth himself. While still on the 																																																								
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hill, the remaining men were forced to retreat to a nearby mill after the Indians set fire to 
the nearby brush.204 The Indians then retreated that night. The fact that reinforcements 
continued to arrive in the town and that part of Sudbury still stood may have softened the 
victory for the Indians, since they knew that the damage at Sudbury did not crush English 
zeal.205 Mary Rowlandson, who was still in captivity after Sudbury, recounted the scene 
at the Indian town of Wachusett after the victory: “Yet they came home without that 
rejoicing and triumphing over their victory which they were wont to show at other times, 
but rather like dogs (as they say) which have lost their ears. Yet I could not perceive that 
it was for their own loss of men.”206 
Sudbury presents an almost perfect example of a combination between a raid and 
an ambush. The battle started off as a raid, much like what we had seen at Lancaster, but 
quickly developed into a much larger affair. Twice Indian warriors ambushed English 
troops as they came into Sudbury. One group of eleven men from Concord lost all but 
one man. Yet, Sudbury exhibits some interesting tactical decisions by the Native force. 
Not only did they not retreat in the face of this influx of men, but they actively shifted 
their tactics to hold the English in certain locations, effectively cutting groups off from 
one another. In other words, it was apparently an impromptu divide and conquer tactic. 
This, as Mandell notes, was uncharacteristic of Native warfare. Instead of retreating in 
the face of potentially deadly odds, the Native warriors decided to stand and fight, but the 
exact reason behind this decision is unknown.207 That being said, they did not stand and 
fight in a traditional European sense, instead they used their tried and true ambush 
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guerilla tactics to surprise incoming English men. They then followed up the ambush 
with continued fire. 
The Battle of Sudbury was a nightmare for the English. Even though the English 
command knew about a sizable Indian force in the Marlborough/Sudbury area, they did 
not adequately reinforce the town, and had, in fact, sent Wadsworth to Marlborough, not 
Sudbury. The rest of the English reinforcements did not move out until after news of the 
battle had spread. Even after word of the attack reached nearby towns there was no 
coordinated effort to repel the Indians.208 Wadsworth had some success, forming his men 
into a square and fighting off the Indians for several hours. However, a brush fire forced 
Wadsworth and his men to withdraw resulting in Wadsworth’s death along with several 
others.209 This uncoordinated defense aside, I would like to address how the English 
stationed its men and how they were able to get to Sudbury so quickly. 
To explain the quick response of the English reinforcements, it is necessary to 
understand the English militia system. The English militia system designated that each 
county had a company of trained men.210 Even if the company was in garrison or 
otherwise not engaged, it was easy to reinforce another company in a nearby town or 
county, especially since some towns and counties, like Boston, could field and pay 
multiple companies. These men could be pressed into the services of other company 
commanders.211 The duty of these men was the defense of their designated area. In the 
case of the Battle of Sudbury this system proved effective in allowing reinforcements to 
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get to Sudbury. A disadvantage, however, lay in the experience of the men. Many of the 
men that formed these companies may not have had any military experience at all. 
The waning months of the conflict saw two distinct but connected campaigns 
from the English. In the June campaign of 1676 the English and their Native allies led a 
series of attacks on Indian food sources. This campaign that took place mainly in the 
Connecticut River Valley and left Philip and his remaining allies without much needed 
supplies. This campaign was a two-pronged movement. Major John Talcott of 
Connecticut went north towards Hadley, Massachusetts, while Major Daniel Henchman 
traveled west towards the same city. On June 12, 1676, at Hadley, the combined English 
forces along with their Mohawk and Mohegan allies repelled the last organized attack by 
an Indian force in the Connecticut River Valley.212  
Then, in July and August of 1676, the English turned their attention to capturing 
Philip and other Native American leaders. The use of Native allies was crucial in tracking 
Indian leaders. In the first three days of July, with the help of Indian allies, Major Talcott 
of Connecticut killed or captured over 250 Narragansetts, including Ninigretng sister 
Quaiapen and Narragansett leader Potuck.213 Benjamin Church and a group of Christian 
Indians, having learned from Indian tactics, then set up the ambush that would kill Philip. 
The ambush took place on the Mount Hope Peninsula that Philip had called home at the 
beginning of the war. The trap was sprung early by an Indian presumably out hunting 
before Philip and his company had time to wake. A lone Indian happened upon Church 
and his men, setting off a panic.214 Because Church had placed men on both sides of the 
swamp there was no room for Philip to escape. Philip was shot and killed on August 12, 																																																								
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1676, by an Indian ally of the English in an ambush orchestrated by Captain Benjamin 
Church.215 
The success of these final two English campaigns or counter-offensives relied 
almost solely on the adoption of Native tactics by the English and the greater use of 
Indian allies. Despite what might be believed, the English disdain at the beginning of the 
war for any Indian, Christian or otherwise, prevented their use as scouts or warriors. 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, did not use Native forces until April of 1676.216 
The success of the June campaign persuaded the colonies to not only begin recruiting 
more heavily from their allies, but also from Christian Indians whom they had placed in 
captivity in a town on Deer Island.  
The end of the war came swiftly once the tide of the war changed in English 
favor. Despite the seemingly constant string of Indian victories during their second spring 
offensive in 1676, the fourteen-month conflict had heavily weakened the resolve of Philip 
and his allies.217 Because of the events of the June campaign, Natives could no longer 
mount a successful summer offensive. The English then began to give mercy to Indians 
who chose to surrender. Once some of Philip’s own forces surrendered following their 
leader’s death, the effect snowballed.218 Truth be told, this so-called “mercy” often ended 
in execution or slavery, but the English tried to go about it in an official, lawful manner. 
The Indians were tried in court. Those whom the English felt committed greater crimes 
were sentenced to death if found guilty. Others were given immunity in exchange for 
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helping the English.219 Not only that, but it became clear that the English would accept 
nothing less than a complete victory. Philip’s death also played an important role in the 
quick collapse of organized resistance, but even before Philip died several other Indian 
leaders had been killed and/or captured. With the orchestrator and leader dead at the 
hands of the English, there was no one left to hold the Indians together.  
After the war the United Colonies began the slow work of rebuilding. In a few 
short years control over New England was given to the Governor of New York by the 
Crown and Massachusetts annexed Plymouth colony. Life resumed starting with the rapid 
increase in population and some return to economic success. Yet, resettlement was slow; 
in some areas of western Massachusetts resettlement did not take place until the early 
1700s.220 For the indigenous population there was a much bleaker picture. King Philip’s 
War effectively killed Native independence and autonomy in the region.221 In addition to 
their political turmoil, the New England Natives lost about half their total population due 
to combat, disease, hunger, slavery, or migration towards New France.222 Specifically the 
Wampanoag were dispersed and those remaining in the area were closely supervised. 
Supposedly only a few hundred Narragansetts survived the conflict and their lands were 
largely taken by the English.223  
King Philip’s War is a prime example of warfare in the Eastern Woodlands during 
the late seventeenth century. As shown in the campaigns and battles of the conflict, 
Native warriors showed their skill in guerilla warfare by using their raiding strategies 
against English settlements on the frontier and orchestrating carefully planned ambushes. 																																																								
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The English, despite suffering severe losses, continued to fight the Indians and would 
eventually adopt Native fighting styles to help end the conflict. Both Native people and 
English colonists played to their strengths, but also exploited the other’s weaknesses. 
Although the Natives themselves did not show any drastic shift in military strategy or 
tactics, with the exception of the fight at Sudbury, they did show how effectively they 
could fight what many might consider a superior force with superior ways of war. 
Sometimes laymen and even historians relate the notion of the Noble Savage fighting in a 
losing battle.  I hope that by showing just how effective these Native strategies and tactics 
were, that it lessens the stain of this outdated and erroneous idea. The English were not 
always the superior fighting force as often described. Instead, it was only by adapting to 
Native tactics and employing Native allies that they were able to succeed in New 
England. In King Philip’s War, as I have described, the English made many mistakes 
which cost them hundreds of lives. Yet, the English were determined and would not 
accept anything less than total victory.  
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Chapter III 
The Battle for the Old Northwest: 
1786-1795 
 The final stage of warfare in the Easter Woodlands that I will analyze occurred in 
the highly sought after Ohio territory of the late eighteenth century. This theater of war 
was not only the longest conflict of the three under study, but also the most complex. The 
present-day states of Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Kentucky experienced a 
series of conflicts that extended back to Lord Dunmore’s War in the 1770s. Tribes such 
as the Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware made attempts to push back British colonists from 
settling inside their territory. The Revolutionary War, although changing the name of 
those people trying to enter the lands from the east, did not eliminate the threat to native 
lands. Thus the United States of America was faced with its first war as a new nation in 
the Ohio Territory. A mix of retaliatory raids and pitched battles characterized the 
Northwest Indian War, which began in 1786. The raids and campaigns of the Northwest 
Indian War demonstrate significant microevolution within the conflict itself, but also 
serve as an ending point for our look at broader military shifts. The events of this conflict 
are important in understanding just how much change had occurred by this point in time.  
 To understand the conflicts in this area, we first need to look at why this territory 
was so important to both groups and what it looked like. The land between the 
Mississippi River and the Pennsylvania state line and above the Ohio River was very 
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fertile and contained important waterways. To the north lay the Great Lakes and Canada. 
Important trading posts and forts were sprinkled throughout the territory. In the early 
seventeenth century, French traders were already forming relationships with people who 
had been pushed into this region by the Iroquois during the Beaver Wars.224 For the 
Americans, it was a frontier for settlement and farming. It was land for buying or taking. 
For the Native tribes in the region it was home and they vowed to defend it.  
 
Figure 3: Map of Northwest Region. Source: Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War: 
The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 
2. 
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Tribal nations in this area included the Shawnee, Potawatomi, Miami, Mingo, 
Wea, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Delaware, Sac, Chippewa, and Ottawa. These people were 
widely dispersed, each living near well-known rivers or the great lakes. Some people, like 
the Shawnee, were small and had split into several groups and often settled with other 
Indians in the region. The Miami tribe had given many Shawnee groups refuge from the 
Iroquois.225  The Miami had been living in the area for generations. Of those who 
ultimately were drawn into conflict with the British and then the Americans, some like 
the Potawatomi lived further west on the edge of the Great Lakes area, but were 
convinced by great leaders of the importance of this fight. Each of these tribes played a 
significant role. The Miami, Shawnee, and Three Fires (Potawatomi, Chippewa, and 
Ottawa) played a more central role in organizing Indian resistance, while the Mingo and 
Wyandot, although present in council fires, seemingly provided more warriors than 
tactical plans. The Shawnee, for example, were central in organizing tribal councils and 
maintaining tribal connections even though they were numerically small.226 
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Figure 4: Map of Northwest Indian Domains. Source: Wiley Sword, President Washington’s 
Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985), 14. 
In this chapter I evaluate both Indian and American raids from an overall strategic 
standpoint, using specific examples when applicable. I analyze the three major campaigns 
in depth and the Native responses to these campaigns. In tandem with these campaigns, I 
examine three battles in depth: Harmar’s Retreat, St. Clair’s Defeat, and the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers. There were other battles, a few of which I mention, but these three were 
the pivotal moments and provide ample opportunity to examine Indian and American 
battle tactics.  
 The Northwest Indian War lasted from 1786 to 1795. The conflict began with two 
raids by George Roger Clark and Benjamin Logan in response to Indian raids in the 
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Kentucky Territory earlier in 1786. The exact reason for these early Indian raids seems to 
escape history. That being said, historian John Sugden makes the case that the Shawnee 
war chiefs felt that the civil chiefs had ceded too much Indian land to the Americans. 
When these civil chiefs began to lose sway with the tribe, other Shawnees began 
preparing for war.227 Another possibility is that the raids were retaliatory attacks against 
colonial affronts, which only precipitated more raids and attacks. 
From the winter of 1786 to 1788 there was a lull in raiding during which the 
United States and the Native tribes, led by Joseph Brant, a Mohawk chief who worked as 
a British Indian mediator, discussed the issue of the Ohio Territory and purchasing land. 
These negotiations did little other than stall the coming conflict. The U.S. government 
gave the first governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair, $26,000 to confirm 
disputed treaties and obtain more land. To the dismay of the Natives, St. Clair did not 
have permission to budge on land demands or recant previous treaties, which led to the 
Natives decision to fight the Americans.228 The hardened position of St. Clair, and his 
refusal to renegotiate unfair treaties heightened the war fervor that came after the raids of 
1786. Minor hostilities resumed during late spring of 1788, however, and led to the first 
U.S. expedition into Indian land, led by Josiah Harmar in 1790. In 1791 there was a 
second expedition led by Arthur St. Clair, which ended in St. Clair’s disastrous defeat. 
Fighting continued in 1792 and 1793, but General Anthony Wayne’s campaign in 1794 
ended with the Indian confederation defeat at Fallen Timbers. The Treaty of Greenville in 
1795 officially ended the conflict and resulted in the cession of nearly all the remaining 
Indian lands in the Ohio Territory to the United States. 																																																								
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 The weapons used by these groups are far removed in some ways from the ones 
discussed in previous chapters, but still operated on similar principles. Firearms were the 
weapons of choice for both forces, but they were not the only weapons used in combat. 
Each side also possessed their own unique arms. Artillery, in the form of cannons, also 
played a role in this conflict. Although this is not the first time we have seen artillery, it is 
the first time it was used on a large scale in pitched battles. St. Clair had eight pieces of 
artillery, a majority of which were six-pound brass cannons.229 Some of the eight were 
three-pound brass cannons.230 The Natives forces secured some of these and hid them to 
use later in the war, but were not able to recover them before General Wayne’s men 
discovered the cannons while building Fort Defiance.231 
 The weapons used by the Americans, or the Natives for that matter, had not 
undergone any major changes since the American Revolution. 232 The infantry used two 
different kinds of musket: the 1763 and 1777 Model Charleville smooth bore muskets. 
Both of these muskets were French models left over from the American Revolution. The 
rifleman in each sub-legion used Lancaster County rifles.233 These were used by Wayne’s 
army, but it is likely that Harmar’s and St. Clair’s army used the same firearms. Although 
they were flintlock muskets, they were much improved from the basic flintlocks used in 
King Philip’s War. The flintlock in this period had improved firing mechanisms and was 
more diverse in design. Rifles made their first appearance at this time. Rifling itself dates 
back to the sixteenth century, but due to the preciseness of the process of creating them, 																																																								
229 Sugden, Blue Jacket, 121. 
230 Wiley Sword, President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 179. 
231 William Heath, William Wells and the Struggles for the Old Northwest (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2015), 188. 
232 M. L. Brown, Firearms in Colonial America (Washington City: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980), 
360. 
233 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 234. 
	81	
rifles were not widely available until much later. Rifles were preferred over muskets for 
their greater accuracy. The difference between muskets and rifles is simple. A rifle had 
spiraling grooves cut inside the barrel to cause the projectile to spin allowing for greater 
range and greater accuracy.234 The army also used various designs of pistols. In addition, 
General Wayne made adjustments to his troops’ rifles and muskets. In order to have a 
more sure priming and longer sight picture for targeting enemies, Wayne filled in the old 
touchhole and drilled a new one at an oblique angle. This lessened the chance of light 
troops losing portions of their powder.235 
 The firearms used by Native forces were primarily obtained through trade with 
British companies. The two principle British companies that provided Native Americans 
with guns at this time were the Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company, 
which traded firearms for pelts, skins, and hides. 236 The guns they provided, known as 
Northwest fusils, were available to most of the Native groups in the Ohio Territory. Fusil 
is a French term for gun that dates back to the mid-1600s.237 Following the American 
Revolution, the British also provided the Natives with weapons in hopes of using Native 
allies as a stable buffer zone between Canada and the United States. The Natives also 
used rifles that American’s dropped fleeing from Indian ambushes.238 When shot, 
powder, or firearms were scarce Native forces resorted to using their bows. Before St. 
Clair’s Defeat, for example, many warriors had used up their shot hunting and many did 
not even have muskets.239 Clearly, Indian warriors still knew how to use their Native 																																																								
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arms. This illustrates that although Native people were becoming increasingly dependent 
on European manufactured goods, they maintained some technological independence.  
 Wars are often personified by their great leaders; this series of conflict is no 
exception. General Anthony Wayne, Blue Jacket, Little Turtle, Arthur St. Clair, and 
Josiah Harmar were among the many leaders responsible for the great battles and great 
failures in the Northwest Indian War.  In order to understand the decisions made in these 
conflicts it is important to understand the leaders’ military backgrounds. We carry our 
experiences with us, so the conflicts that these men did or did not experience impacted 
how they made decisions later on. 
 I wish first to look at Blue Jacket of the Shawnee. Blue Jacket was born a Pekowi. 
The Pekowi was one of the divisions in Shawnee culture that was responsible for 
leadership during periods of warfare. The Mekoche division provided the civil chiefs.240 
Blue Jacket grew up in a great period of conflict for the Shawnee with the French and 
Indian War raging between the British and the French, but Blue Jacket himself did not 
join the raids till 1763.241 Blue Jacket also participated in Lord Dunmore’s War between 
the Shawnee and Virginia colonists in 1774, which consisted of several raids and even a 
pitched ambush. In the conflict, Blue Jacket participated under Cornstalk in the Battle at 
Point Pleasant, which can be seen as a model for the tactics at St. Clair’s Defeat, which I 
discuss in detail later.242 Blue Jacket also fought in a conflict that occurred during the late 
1770s until about 1783. This time instead of fighting against Virginia British colonists, 
the Shawnee targeted American Kentucky settlers who infringed on their hunting 
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grounds. These experiences undoubtedly helped shape Blue Jacket into a formidable 
commander during the Northwest Indian War. 
 Little Turtle was a Miami Indian, born in the 1750s in a village near the Eel River 
in current day Indiana.243 Unfortunately the specifics of Little Turtle’s early life are not as 
well known as Blue Jacket’s, though it is assumed that Little Turtle had much the same 
military experience as his contemporaries.244 Although early twentieth century historian 
Calvin Young has many ethnocentric and racist tendencies in his writings, he portrays 
Little Turtle as more than just a mere “savage” general. In his biography of the Miami 
leader, Young portrays Little Turtle as both a great traveler and politician. Young asserts 
that Little Turtle was known in many places including Louisiana, Washington D.C., 
Detroit, and several places in Canada.245 Towards the end of the Northwest Indian War, 
Little Turtle began to waiver in his resolve against the American government, but he 
remained an avid supporter of the Indian cause and was well respected in his dealings at 
the Treaty of Greenville.246 
 On the American side, Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair shared some 
similarities in terms of their military experience and failures in the field. Both Harmar 
and St. Clair were veterans of the American Revolution and both underestimated their 
Native adversaries. Harmar had been appointed lieutenant colonel of the First American 
Regiment in 1784.247 Despite his appointment there was no reason to think that Harmar 
would have made a good Indian fighter. Growing up in Philadelphia, he was very 
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urbanized and knew city life, not the frontier. 248 Before receiving his appointment as 
governor of the Northwest Territory, St. Clair had an abundance of military experience in 
both the French and Indian War as a British citizen, and during the American Revolution 
he manned Fort Ticonderoga and came out of the war a major general in the United 
States Army.249  St. Clair had one major disadvantage: illness. St. Clair suffered from 
“bilious colic, rheumatic asthma, and gout”250 which often compromised his leadership 
abilities. 
 General Anthony Wayne was a different storm altogether. Wayne was a 
perfectionist, but had a reputation for being reckless.251 Historian Richard Knopf 
describes Wayne as, “devoted to the military life, his sense of honor, and his gallantry 
were unassailed.”252 During the Revolutionary War, Wayne served as a commander of 
the Pennsylvania Infantry and had even served under Arthur St. Clair. Wayne’s most 
courageous action during the Revolution came after a mistake. Wayne was surprised by a 
British bayonet charge at night at a place called Paoli, but Wayne regained his honor by 
using the same tactic to take Stony Point later in the war.253 After the American 
Revolution, Wayne had a checkered career in politics, which never really agreed with 
him. Wayne also had the nickname “Mad” Anthony, bestowed on him when he refused to 
help a deserter, who grew up in the same area of Pennsylvania as Wayne. The deserter 
called him “mad” and the name stuck.254   
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 The United States army before the Northwest Indian war was miniscule. Due to 
economic constraints, the United States Congress had to discharge most of its army 
shortly after the end of the American Revolution. By mid-1784 there were less than one 
hundred regulars in the United States army, consisting only of one artillery unit at West 
Point and twenty-nine regulars at Fort Pitt.255 In 1789, five years later the standing United 
States Army had grown, but still only consisted of about 672 men.256 It was not until the 
promotion of Anthony Wayne to Major General that the United States military underwent 
the necessary changes to transform it into a professional army.  
General Anthony Wayne headed probably one of the best-trained, yet short-lived 
armies in the history of the United States: The Legion.  Wayne accomplished this, not by 
using newly improved methods of training, but simply by taking the time to instill 
discipline and train by standard methods. For example, Wayne trained his men to shoot at 
specific targets as well as to take their time to aim instead of relying on volume with 
volley fire.257 The Legion was the largest of the three armies that advanced into Indian 
territory, numbering some 1,200 regulars258 and about 1,400 mounted riflemen259 or 
militia. The Legion also had a much more complex infrastructure consisting of four sub-
legions that were further subdivided. Each of the sub-legions consisted of two regiments 
of infantry, one regiment of artillery, one regiment of dragoons, and one regiment of 
rifleman.260 Each sub-legion also had its own independent command structure that 
answered only to General Wayne who was in charge of the combined force. This new 
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style of command structure allowed each sub-legion to operate on its own if need be. If 
the Legion had ever been fully recruited it would have numbered 4,272 enlisted men plus 
an additional 291 officers.261 These reforms were based on the ideas of French military 
theorists Maurice de Saxe and Turpin de Crissé earlier in the eighteenth century.262 
 Prior to Wayne’s reforms, the first two armies under Harmar and St. Clair had 
large contingents of militia. Harmar’s army had just over 1,100 militia with only 320 
regulars. Harmar’s army also contained mounted riflemen, who were in the same vein as 
militia and three light brass cannons.263 St. Clair’s army was slightly more diverse 
containing 600 regulars, 800 levies, and 600 militia by the time of his defeat.264 At the 
beginning of his campaign St. Clair had almost 2,000 six-month levies, which were 
subject to some federal standards and military training. 265 Levies were men who were 
conscripted by the army or raised locally, but differed from militia in that they did meet 
basic standards of military training. This put them at only a slight advantage over militia. 
Harmar attempted to improve his forces by adding more regular troops and levies, with 
mixed results.  
 With the exception of the actions of some of the mounted militia in raids, the 
performance of militia or the levies was very poor in combat. These men were relatively 
untrained and undisciplined. When combat became heavy they retreated, because they 
lacked the stomach to continue fighting and they were unwilling to risk their lives. This 
often caused problems in a battle situation. For example, during St. Clair’s Defeat, the 
Native resistance attacked a forward group of about 300 militia and within just a few 																																																								
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minutes sent them running across the St. Mary’s River to the main camp, causing 
confusion. 266 It was moments like this that both confirmed and perpetuated the militia’s 
reputation for being unreliable.  
 The makeup of the Native armies is difficult to unravel because of the lack of a 
centralized command structure, as well as fluidity in numbers. The number of warriors 
changed based on the personal preference of the warriors themselves. If they felt a fight 
was unwinnable they might not entertain the idea of battle, and warriors were not outright 
punished for leaving.  Unlike western military structures that relied on strict lines of 
command, Native warriors prized individualism. Native warriors took pride in their own 
fighting prowess and their ability to take scalps and other spoils of war.267 These prizes 
advanced a warrior’s prestige and gave him credibility, status, and influence. This is 
especially important in the case of war chiefs, who needed the ability to convince 
warriors to join in fighting. However, war chiefs did not have total coercive control over 
their warriors, but persuaded and commanded through prestige and consensus. It is also 
impossible to know the entire tribal composition of the armies that faced the Americans. 
For example, at the battle of Fort Recovery, Ottawa and Ojibwe warriors rushed the fort 
after a successful ambush on a supply train, costing the Native force fifteen additional 
lives. Although some tribes, like the Delaware, Shawnee, and Miami were probably 
present at all engagements, the remaining components are still subject to debate.268 
Simply put we do not know the full diversity of tribes that participated in all battles.  
We will begin our examination with a look at Clark and Logan’s raids from 
Kentucky. Most of the raids conducted by Americans came from either frontiersmen, also 																																																								
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known as mounted riflemen, or rangers. Even though most of these men were not battle-
hardened veterans of the Revolutionary War, it was not uncommon for the leader of the 
expedition to be a veteran. George Roger Clark was a leader in the western frontier 
during the American Revolution.269 It was this experience that led him to be chosen to 
lead a raid in 1786. In 1786 the District of Kentucky authorized attacks on the Wabash 
areas as retribution for raids that had occurred earlier in 1786 and even before.270 Clark’s 
raid was the larger of the two consisting of some 1,200 men271 while Logan’s force 
consisted of fewer than 800.272 Logan and Clark each had specific areas they were 
supposed to raid. Within these areas, they were supposed to destroy villages and food 
stores and kill warriors where they could. Clark was to head to a French settlement and 
then go up the Wabash River through Wea and Miami territory,273 while Logan was to 
raid Shawnee villages on the Great Miami River.274 They were not necessarily to be 
involved in pitched battles nor were they meant to conquer. The Americans wanted to 
dissuade the Natives from perpetuating a frontier war. They hoped that by destroying 
food stores, attacking innocents, and burning towns the Indians would concede to 
peaceful negotiations.  
 Clark’s raid was not successful. He ran into supply troubles. Most of his supplies 
were sent by boat to Vincennes, but were delayed and spoiled. By the time they marched 
out, dissent had set in and 300 men deserted, which led Clark to abandon his raid before 
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it began.275 On the other hand, Logan’s raid was more successful, but the raid fell on 
peaceful Indians. Despite the fact that one of Logan’s recruits deserted to warn the 
Natives of his advance, Logan caught the village of Mackachack completely off guard. 
Many warriors fled, those who stayed put up a “futile resistance.”276 The Americans 
destroyed the villages and15,000 bushels of corn, took twenty-six women and two 
children prisoner, and took eleven scalps and killed ten chiefs, including Moluntha, an 
important Shawnee civil chief who was friendly to the Americans. According to 
Historian Wiley Sword, the raiders apparently killed Moluntha because when they asked 
Moluntha about his involvement in the Kentuckian defeat at Blue Licks during the 
Revolution, Moluntha not knowing English well answered yes.277 Logan’s Raid 
accomplished its mission of spreading fear, but only for a moment. It also cost the United 
States peaceful Native allies, and resulted in an escalation of Indian raids.  
 From 1786-1790 raiding continued, resulting in a few small skirmishes. By 1790, 
hostilities had escalated to the point where the United States Congress increased their 
standing army. In 1787 a war party of Shawnees lead by Chiksika (the brother of 
Shawnee leader, Tecumseh, who would lead a Pan-Indian alliance in the early nineteenth 
century) raided in southern Kentucky278 Earlier in 1786 and then again in 1788 Shawnees 
under Blue Jacket struck out against the Kentuckians. Blue Jacket was captured in 1788, 
but escaped captivity within a few days.279 According to historian Fairfax Downey, some 
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1,000 Kentuckians had been killed in raids by 1790.280 These raids were conducted in 
retaliation to the events that occurred during the Logan and Clark raids of 1786. Though 
these raids were committed on the idea of blood revenge, at this point in time the Native 
were directly acting against American expansion and making attempts to dissuade them 
from further military actions against their people.  
The U.S retaliated in kind with the aim of punishing Indians and instilling fear 
among the Ohio Territory’s Native populations. They wanted to avenge the deaths of 
those who had died during previous raids, but Sugden makes a point that it was more than 
just revenge. Sugden quotes William North, who said, “’We . . . are taking their land 
from them.’”281 Sugden continues that hatred had been bred between the Kentuckians and 
the Northwest Indians, namely the Shawnee, and how no matter what the circumstances 
savagery broke out when the two groups met. 282 After decades of constant raiding and 
retaliation the two groups had grown a deep resentment for the other resulting in brutality 
and death on both sides.   
 Some historians consider Clark’s and Logan’s raid a campaign based on its size 
and complexity, 283 but I believe that its designation as a raid is appropriate. The purpose 
of a raid is not to subdue an enemy or to conquer, but to cause terror and disrupt everyday 
life. Harmar’s Campaign has some of these qualities, because the point of his campaign 
was to punish or chastise the Native populace.284 The difference between the two comes 
from two points, the mode in which they were conducted and their duration. A raid is 
																																																								
280 Fairfax Downey, Indian Wars of the U.S. Army 1776-1865 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1963), 52.	
281 Sugden, Blue Jacket, 75. 
282 Sugden, Blue Jacket, 75. 
283 Sword, President Washington’s Indian War, 36. 
284 Starkey, European and Native Warfare, 141.	
	91	
indicative of a single action and typically lasts a short period of time. It is possible that 
multiple raids could occur over a prolonged period of time, but these could be separated 
into individual raids. A campaign is typically slower in action and lasts longer. In other 
words the quick attack versus the long march. The two can be combined. It is possible 
that raids can accompany a campaign. In this case there are typically smaller mobile 
divisions, which make fast strikes against enemy homesteads, while a main body 
completes other tasks such as constructing forts or preparing for a larger confrontation.  
 One of the most important details of the Northwest Indian War was the ability of 
the Natives to form a multi-tribe defense against the United States. As previously 
mentioned, the Shawnee were instrumental in organizing the Indian councils that led to 
this pan-Indian resistance, but it is important to understand the broader aspects of this 
confederation. First and foremost, we should not think of this as unique, but not 
altogether common. As Sugden points out, pan-Indian confederacies were often 
established to confront major pressures, but they were very difficult to organize and 
maintain.285 The expansion of American interests into the Ohio Territory by way of 
settlers and land speculation, however, encouraged tribes to join forces in the 1780s and 
1790s. All of these tribes had been affected by the colonialism and expansion of 
European power to some degree, but the influx of Shawnee and Delaware refugees spread 
terrible stories of the Americans.286 News that Americans were massing across the Ohio 
River in 1790 to punish the Indians was all the war chiefs needed to hear to finalize the 
confederacy.  
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 From a strategic standpoint Josiah Harmar’s campaign in 1790 was very simple 
and, in his mind, successful, but it did not end in the manner that Harmar or anyone back 
east would have wanted. The purpose of Harmar’s Campaign was to chastise Indians for 
the raiding that had occurred since the American raids of 1786. This chastisement was 
accomplished by disrupting the daily life of Native people in the form of destroying 
homes and food stores. Over the course of his campaign Harmar claimed responsibility 
for destroying 300 buildings and burning some 20,000 bushels of corn.287 Harmar sent 
teams of 50 regulars augments by hundreds of militia on seek and destroy missions.288 
From a strategic standpoint Harmar’s campaign was a success, because he accomplished 
the goals he set out with. However, Harmar’s campaign ended in a defeat at the hands of 
Little Turtle. One of the key components of Harmar’s Campaign was a secondary force 
under Major John Hamtramck of 100 regulars and 400 militia that was charged with 
attacking villages on the Wabash River, away from Harmar’s advance.289 However, one 
questionable decision had been made during the inception of this campaign. Secretary of 
War Henry Knox told Governor St. Clair to warn the British at Fort Miami and friendly 
Indians of Harmar’s campaign, making secrecy impossible.290 According to Wiley 
Sword, “the army’s march thus seemed to resemble a herd of elephants trampling through 
the underbrush.”291 
 What was the Native response to Harmar’s campaign? Although we cannot know 
their specific intentions, it seems that Native forces wanted to trick Harmar into a false 
sense of security. Little Turtle and Blue Jacket appear to have let Harmar burn the 																																																								
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villages and food stores in order to make Harmar believe he had caught them unaware.292 
Native warriors never strayed far away from Harmar’s force, however, and kept a close 
eye on his movements.293 Rather than confront Harmar’s forces in the open, the Native 
warriors evacuated their communities and waited for the perfect moment to strike.  
 Harmar’s Defeat occurred over the course of four days from October 19 to 22. On 
October 19 a group of 150 militia and 30 regulars under Colonel John Hardin, while 
trying to find the Indians positions, ran into about 150 warriors under Miami war chief 
Little Turtle. Hardin ordered a pursuit of two Indians who they surprised in an old Indian 
campsite. These two Indians led Hardin into an ambush. After some distance Indians 
under Little Turtle fired from the right first, which turned the militia into another firing 
line on the left.294 The militia broke quickly. Even though the regulars made an attempt to 
stand and fight they could not withstand the charge of the Native forces. Fortunately, in 
the retreat the Americans ran into one of their own detachments and the warriors did not 
pursue into this second line.295 On October 20 and 21 Harmar’s forces went about raiding 
and burning villages, but no large scale fighting took place.296 
 The events of October 22 were similar to those of October 19, but on a larger 
scale. Harmar ordered a group of 400 men to find and attack the Miami village of 
Kekionga.  The acting commander of this force was Major John Palsgrave Wyllys. 
Wyllys’ plan was to launch a surprise attack on the village from three directions. 297 
Wyllys’ plan however did not go as expected. Wylly’s column of 60 regulars and 40-
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mounted militia were en route to their position when they were ambushed in a defile next 
to the Maumee River.298 With most of the cavalry and some of the regulars in the open, 
Native warriors fired from both sides of the defile. Fortunately for Wylly, one of the 
other wings of the army under Major James McMillan, numbering 150 men, heard the 
fire and cut back towards Wyllys’ position. After taking some fire from the newly arrived 
Americans, the Native force retreated past the ruins of Kekionga into an open cornfield 
with Wyllys and McMillan in pursuit. However, Little Turtle had an ambush waiting. The 
Indians began firing at the Americans, killing many of them outright. The Americans 
continued to skirmish, fight, retreat, and push forward. Eventually the Native warriors 
vanished into the underbrush after they began to suffer their own losses.299 All in all 
Harmar lost some 183 men killed and 31 men wounded over the course of his 
campaign.300 
The failures of Harmar’s campaign are manifested in his defeat in two areas: 
military training and leadership decisions.  The militia in Harmar’s case was 
exceptionally bad. When the militia arrived in September of 1790 some of the 
Pennsylvania militia did not even have guns. They were not the seasoned frontiersmen 
Harmar expected, nor had they any military experience.301 The other faults lie in 
Harmar’s decision making. Harmar wanted to fight the Northwest Indians in open field 
combat, but they would not give him such a luxury since Native warriors preferred 
skirmishes in wooded areas where they would withstand fewer casualties. Harmar also 
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spread his forces thin, which left not only his supply line vulnerable and his main force 
prone to attack.302 
 The Native American warriors played to their strength in this struggle by using 
their tried and true ambush tactics. Indian forces used ambush tactics by waiting till the 
Americans were in a vulnerable position and then surprised them. They used the 
knowledge of the terrain to their advantage and moved unseen by the Americans. When 
the Native warriors had the American army in their sites they sprung their trap and 
inflicted heavy casualties. It also helped that the Americans often underestimated the 
Natives’ ability to fight, despite the effectiveness of their tactics. Native forces 
successfully caught the Americans off guard on October 19. The effective scouting by 
Native warriors and the lack of American awareness were instrumental to the Native 
success. The fight at Kekionga on October 22 was a tactical concerted effort on the other 
hand. Little Turtle had deliberately used the original ambush force that attacked Wyllys 
to pull the rest of the American forces into a greater ambush.303 Native losses are subject 
to scrutiny. Sword gives some credit to St. Clair’s report of almost 200 Indian dead, but 
mentions that other reports come at 40 or just over 100.304 St. Clair may have inflated the 
numbers to make the campaign seem more successful. William Heath on the other hand 
completely disregards St. Clair’s report. Heath states that, “casualties did not exceed 
fifty.”305 
We can see a glimpse here into one problem in the Indian command structure. If 
Little Turtle had better control over his forces, he could have prevented unnecessary loss 
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of life. Based on the openness of the cornfield where the fight took place, the Indians 
getting caught in Saint Mary’s River and Saint Joseph’s River between two Kentucky 
forces seems preventable. A group of Natives were caught between the remnants of 
McMillan’s force and the newly arrived third wave under Horatio Hall in the midst of 
these two rivers, where they were cut down.306  Indian leadership also placed a heavy 
importance on supernatural omens as a way of planning war strategies. The Indian force 
had planned on attacking Harmar again with some newly arrived 700 Ottawa warriors, 
but a lunar eclipse, which the Ottawa read as a bad omen, caused them to abandon the 
endeavor, so they left Little Turtle.307 
 Arthur St. Clair’s campaign in 1791 shared some similarities in purpose with that 
of Harmar’s 1790 campaign, including a series of augmenting raids by Charles Scott and 
James Wilkinson.308 This set of raids actually preceded St. Clair’s campaign, but were an 
integral part of the overall strategy. One exception was that while Harmar was not 
permitted to build forts in Indian country, St. Clair had the responsibility of establishing a 
string of forts in the Northwest Territory. After the events of Harmar’s campaign, the 
United States realized that they would need forts, especially in the Indian heartland, to 
control the area.309 St. Clair’s campaign was meant to bring the Indians to terms for land, 
but also to restore American prestige.310 The United States was a fledgling nation and 
needed to show the world that it could hold its own. If the United States could not defeat 
these perceived “savages” then how could they compete against other powers like Great 
Britain? Despite the United States’ lofty ambitions, however, St. Clair’s campaign was a 																																																								
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failure. Not only did St. Clair fail to force the Indians into negotiations, but he also 
suffered one of the greatest defeats at the hands of an indigenous force ever in American 
military history.  
  The most curious problem that St. Clair had was shortage of tools, which 
prolonged his building of necessary forts. The campaign also suffered from a lack of 
normal supplies: clothes, food, and tents. One key consequence of this problem was the 
threat of desertion. St. Clair made put part of the First Regiment in charge of protecting 
his supply lines from his own men, which took the regiment out of the decisive battle of 
his campaign. This was a serious mistake. In addition, St. Clair suffered from a lack of 
information. He had no idea what the Natives were planning nor where they were or how 
many they were.311  
 The pan-Indian resistance responded to St. Clair’s campaign in much the way that 
they had with Harmar. Native warriors refrained from getting involved in pitched combat 
with this large American force until the right moment. One reason for this was that the 
raids of Scott and Wilkinson, while not bringing the Natives to their knees, did make the 
Natives think for just a moment that the United States might return to a state of constant 
militia and ranger raiding. This raiding, when done properly, threatened the lives of entire 
villages including women and children, not to mention the loss of food they would suffer. 
One important difference here from Harmar’s campaign is that the Natives did a better 
job of consolidating their forces to fight against St. Clair. The force of Native warriors 
that assembled for St. Clair’s defeat was the largest of the three, numbering at about 
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1,100 men.312 With this force now assembled the warriors slowly advanced from their 
camp less than half a mile from St. Clair’s position.313 
 St. Clair’s Defeat occurred on November 4, 1791.314 Often referred to as the 
“frontier Cannae,”315 it was the worst defeat the United States suffered at the hands of 
Native people until the Battle of Little Bighorn in the late nineteenth century. St. Clair 
had divided his force by putting a small contingent of militia, numbering 320 men, on the 
north side of the Wabash River and the main camp to the south. The main camp was not 
in a particularly defensible position.316 Early in the morning a group of warriors surprised 
the militia on the north side of the river. It is likely that the militia only fired one shot 
before retreating across the river. This retreat caused confusion in the main camp where 
the men had been recently released from parade. One of the lines of infantry, under 
Richard Butler, managed to reform causing the Natives to falter, but this was not enough 
to keep the warriors from encircling the camp where they began to pick off artillerymen 
and officers.317  
 The course of the battle quickly deteriorated for the Americans. The Americans 
could not find their targets. The surrounding Indians used the brush and trees as cover so 
the Americans had problems hitting their enemies.  The Americans tried to push back on 
all sides, but to no avail. In one particular instance men under lieutenant colonel Darke 
fastened bayonets and charged towards Indians in the rear. The Indians fled, but Darke 
and his men charged too far forward only to be enveloped by Wyandot.318 There were 																																																								
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other such sorties, but they met similar fates. As the American’s were forced into the 
center of the camp they knew their situation was dire. After pushing a group of Wyandot 
and Mingo warriors back from the center of camp, St. Clair decided to cut a path to the 
trail on which the American force had traveled to this location.319 The fighting in this 
instance was intense. The intensity of this fight may be attributed to the fact that the 
Wyandot and Mingo had begun killing civilians--mostly women--who had accompanied 
the camp. Some 200 men massed a charge against the rear of their position and ran 
headlong back to American Fort Jefferson.320 The losses were significant. 
In this battle, Blue Jacket and Little Turtle had devised a masterful plan of attack 
against St. Clair’s unfortified positions. They had divided their warriors into three sides. 
The frontal assault was manned by the Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee, on the left flank 
were placed the Ottawa, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi, and on the right flank were the 
Wyandot and Mingo.  Aided by St. Clair’s lack of information, the Natives attack went 
perfectly as planned. Their only negative moment was when the Wyandot and Mingo 
were pushed back after breaking into the center of the American camp. When the 
Americans managed to push through the rear, the natives gave a short chase of only about 
four or five miles, but the battle had already been won. 
 The loss for the Americans was especially humiliating, given their superior 
numbers. In 1786 after the raids of Logan and Clark, over 1,400 warriors were in the 
Wabash Valley, including forces from five tribes.321 When this number is combined with 
the number of Native troops from the other primary engagements the number arises to 
approximately 5,640 warriors. This number includes the warriors present for the 																																																								
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American campaigns, but these numbers are harder to track. In many cases the sources go 
off approximations from participants, which may have been exaggerated or not altogether 
grounded in evidence. Three times the United States Congress and Secretary of War 
Henry Knox sent armies into the Old Northwest Territory. Each of these armies 
numbered more than a thousand men. The combined force of the armies under Harmar, 
St. Clair, and Wayne numbered 7,720 men.322 This number included regulars, militia, and 
some of the mounted volunteer regiments where numbers are available. If we include the 
forces under Roger Clark and Benjamin Logan the number rises to 9,710.  
The estimated number of American casualties at St. Clair’s defeat comes to 630 
men killed and 282 wounded.323 The Indians suffered 21 dead and 40 wounded.324 In this 
battle the Americans lost almost half their force and inflicted minimal on the other side, 
but this did not dissuade the Americans from making another campaign. After all, they 
had the manpower. The population of the United States in 1790 was 3,929,214 with an 
estimated fighting-age population of 982,304, so men could be called up as necessary. 325  
Granted the United States ability to call up this many individuals is questionable at the 
least, but it does bring home the point of population differences. This is contrary to the 
warrior population of the Miami, which numbered maybe 1290.326  Understand that this 
is only one tribe. The population of the combined tribes in the Northwest Territory was 
much larger, but any one tribe did not have sufficient numbers to resist American 
aggressions. Not only this, but loss of life affected Native groups to a higher degree. Even 
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if a smaller tribe lost only 15 men, this represented a greater percentage of the population. 
One of the reasons for this disparity is disease. Smallpox was highly detrimental to 
Native people, because they had no acquired immunity to the disease. During the 
Revolutionary War a great smallpox epidemic covered much of North America, including 
the Old Northwest.327 This led to a dramatic reduction of the Indian population in the 
region just prior to the Northwest Indian War.  
 Following the debacle of St. Clair’s campaign the U.S. renewed its efforts, 
although General Anthony Wayne’s campaign would not begin until the spring of 1793.  
Wayne had taken all the necessary measures to train and prepare his army during 1792 
and early 1793 to ensure that the mistakes of the previous two campaigns would not be 
repeated. The overall war strategy set out by Secretary of War Henry Knox included 
another series of raids in late 1792 and early 1793, known as the desultory war. These 
raids led to a series of small American defeats. Coupled with these operations, Knox 
made political overtures to the Six Nations in hopes of keeping them out of the war. To 
this end he convinced various chiefs of the Six Nations and Mohawk chief Joseph Brant 
of their sincerity of American peace talks, and with some monetary incentive towards 
Brant, the United States managed to dissuade them from joining the Indian resistance in 
the Northwest.328 Knox also commanded Wayne to establish more forts, including one on 
the site of St. Clair’s defeat, which became known as Fort Recovery.329 One major 
difference in Wayne’s campaign from the previous campaigns was that he had an ample 
number of scouts and rangers at his disposal. Wayne entered the Maumee Valley in July 
1794 and went on a campaign of destroying Indian villages. Wayne even built a new fort 																																																								
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named Fort Defiance on the confluence of the Saint Joseph, Auglaize, and Maumee 
Rivers. The destruction stopped only when the Natives decided to fight at Fallen 
Timbers. 
By 1793 the Shawnee had successfully brought warriors to their cause and 
assembled a force of some 2,000 men.330 The Native resistance had a more cohesive 
strategy, which included attacking Wayne’s supply lines and communications cutting him 
off from necessary resources. This plan may not have been formulated until late June of 
1794,331 but the attacks had been occurring long before then. One such example is when 
Little Otter, an Ottawa chief, successfully ambushed a party of some 120 Americans with 
only forty warriors on October 17, 1793.332 The most important of this strategy, however, 
occurred on June 30, 1794, when a group of 1,100 warriors ambushed a convoy outside 
Fort Recovery. Unfortunately during the attack on the convoy, Chippewa and Ottawa 
warriors attacked the fort itself. With a clear field of fire the American garrison picked 
off warriors who pressed the attack for several hours, which caused unwanted losses for 
the Native force.333 This attack shows one weakness of Native American warfare at this 
time: the inability to take forts.  
 Although the inability of Natives to take forts played a much bigger role in the 
War of 1812, the incident at Fort Recovery sheds some important light on a few details. 
First and foremost Natives did not have any form of artillery, and small arms fire was 
ineffective against a fort. In previous chapters the Natives built and used defensive 
positions and there is even evidence that they knew siege techniques, but that experience 
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was against other Native forts and not those of European style. Native forts were more 
likened to palisaded towns, whereas European fortifications were engineered with much 
more intricate defense capabilities. Not only that, but by the eighteenth century many 
Native groups had abandoned wooden stockades in the old Northwest.334 On many 
occasions Native forces could have very easily outnumbered the men inside a fort and 
stormed it, but the number of men who might die in the process proved too much to make 
the endeavor worthwhile. Instead, warriors often surprised American soldiers outside 
their fortifications using their ambush tactics.335  
 The Battle of Fallen Timbers took place on August 20, 1794.336 The Indians had 
positioned themselves in an area of trees that had been blown over by a recent tornado, 
hence the name Fallen Timbers. 337 Fallen Timbers was somewhat of an anticlimactic 
ending for such a colorful conflict. Throughout the course of the war, Native forces had 
used ambush tactics, surprise, and capitalized on mistakes made by the American 
generals to their advantage, but here they decided to make a stand. The Indian resistance 
assumed that Wayne would advance up the Maumee River, and they were confident that 
they could hold Wayne at bay from this natural fortification. Unfortunately for the Native 
resistance, they made a mistake in timing. Many of the warriors had fasted for two days 
before battle in order to purify themselves, body and soul, and not half of the Indians had 
returned to their position for they were out hunting and gathering food.338 Even though 
the scales looked greatly in their favor in the beginning, the loss of manpower was costly. 
The fasting would not have been a problem, except for the fact that Wayne’s approach 																																																								
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took longer than the Natives had anticipated, causing warriors to be gone in search of 
food when Wayne finally reached the field of battle.  
 There is an important shift in strategy here. The decision to stand and fight at 
Fallen Timbers, although understandable given their initial numbers, proved folly. With 
the exception of the events following the unplanned attack on Fort Recovery, the Native 
strategy of attacking Wayne’s supply lines was successful. Yet, the events at Fort 
Recovery caused certain tribes and leaders to second-guess themselves. Little Turtle, one 
of the masterminds behind the early victories, began to petition the British for more direct 
involvement, which cost him some of his prestige. His allies saw that he was losing hope 
in the confederacy. More importantly however, General Wayne’s campaign 
improvements did not allow for successful use of Native tactics. Wayne used Chickasaw 
and Choctaw warriors as scouts on the march up the Maumee River, which prevented the 
pan-Indian resistance from using their greatest asset, surprise.339   
 Wayne marched up the Maumee River in full force. His vanguard came upon the 
position and received a tremendous volley. Only some 500 warriors manned the position 
including 70 Canadian militiamen, but they were determined to hold it.340 Wayne ordered 
his mounted militia to attack the Indians’ position on its flanks, but the Indians were 
sheltered by the thick forest and their fortified position.341 In the end it was a simple 
bayonets charge that finished the Indians. The charge began with a premature charge by 
Captain Robert Campbell supported by Brigadier General Wilkinson and ended with 
pursuit by American Dragoons after the bayonet chased the Natives from their position. 
General Wayne pressed the attack from all directions with all of his sub-legions. Native 																																																								
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warriors’ greatly feared American bayonets and cavalry.342 At Fallen Timbers there was 
nowhere to run inside the fallen trees, so when Wayne’s forces pressed the attack the 
Native warriors were trapped in their lines. The Natives had faced an uphill battle from 
the beginning; with so few men against a force so large it is doubtful that the Native force 
could have fought against Wayne for long. The Battle of Fallen Timbers ended with 
Wayne’s army suffering some 44 men killed and 100 men wounded, while the Natives 
lost around 40 men.343 
 One reason for Wayne’s success may have come from the small shift in linear 
firing tactics. Despite their prevalence in military thought throughout most of the 
gunpowder age, linear firing tactics have played little obvious role in the previous two 
chapters, but have been alluded to several times here, though they were undoubtedly used 
in King Philip’s War. In the Northwest Indian War, as I noted in the beginning, General 
Wayne made reforms which including picking targets. It is true that these men still fired 
in linear formations, but instead of blindly firing in lines they picked their targets. Here 
will be a good time to juxtapose the tactics of St. Clair with the reforms of General 
Wayne. If you recall from St. Clair’s Defeat, the militia and regulars filed into lines and 
fired into the brush to no success, for the brush and trees shielded Native warriors from 
the firing line. The reforms of Wayne are important to note, but hard to track. Although it 
is likely that the preciseness of this new style of linear tactics would have increased the 
Native loss of life, the fallen trees likely lessened this advantage. However, the loss of so 
many principal men may be evidence of these tactics. Wayne’s men could have picked 
men they saw as leaders to fire at resulting in this loss discrepancy.  																																																								
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 Despite the relatively light casualties, the Battle of Fallen Timbers was a disaster 
for the pan-Indian resistance. Even though the Natives had only lost some 40 men, they 
had lost many important war chiefs including the principal chief of the Sandusky 
Wyandot.344 More important was the British refusal of help at Fort Miami. After the 
battle was over the Indians fled towards the fort, but the gates were shut.345 The British 
were not ready to make such an action against the United States. The British did not have 
the manpower or the equipment to start a frontier war with the United States nor did the 
British government wish to fight so soon after the American Revolution.  Without this 
direct military help the pan-Indian resistance began to fall to pieces. 
 In the wake of Fallen Timbers Anthony Wayne’s Legion were sent to destroy 
Indian villages in the Maumee and Auglaize River Valleys.346  It was soon after that that 
peace talks began. The war chiefs had lost their power and now the civil chiefs who 
advocated for accommodation led the push in the negotiations with the American 
government. After almost a year, the Native tribes ceded southern and eastern Ohio, parts 
of southern Indiana, and sixteen other concessions, along with confirming land cessions 
from previous treaties.347 The Northwest Indian War ended with the Treaty of Greenville, 
which was signed on August 3, 1795, giving the Americans several land concessions and 
removing the British from Fort Miami.348 Yet, that was not the end of conflict in this 
region. A decade later Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa revitalized Indian religion and 
resistance.  
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 The Northwest Indian War provides a clear example of the state of warfare in the 
Eastern Woodlands in the late eighteenth century. The mistakes and failures of Harmar 
and St. Clair forced the American military system to evolve in order to face its enemy. 
These changes culminated in the success of Wayne’s final campaign into Indian territory. 
For the Native Americans there was almost a reversal in strategy and tactics. Throughout 
the course of the war, whether in pitched battles or small skirmishes, the ambush tactic or 
strategy worked remarkably well for several reasons. If you look at the first two 
campaigns and battles the Natives used the American’s lack of intelligence and poor 
leadership to their advantage. The Americans also underestimated their Native adversary. 
The decision to change that tactic and confront an American army from an under-manned 
fortified position seems suspect, because the Battle of Fallen Timbers tactically did not 
play to traditional Native advantages in war, especially after the success of attacking 
Wayne’s supply lines. The abandonment of a Native ambush strategy did not pan out in 
their favor at Fallen Timbers. Yet, throughout the majority of the conflict we see how 
remarkable Native forces are at fighting numerical larger forces with more resources.  
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Conclusion: 
The Echoes of War 
 
 The conflicts discussed in this thesis were benchmarks in North America’s 
military history. In order to understand the broader changes in military strategy and 
tactics that took place over three centuries of contact and combat, it is important to 
understand the small changes in individual conflicts. The body chapters discussed the 
microevolutions that occurred during De Soto’s invasion, King Philip’s War, and the 
Northwest Indian War. With these changes in mind, we can now turn to the large scale 
transformation in military strategy and tactics. Men carry the experiences of their 
predecessors. Maybe General Anthony Wayne did not read the Chronicles of Hernando 
De Soto’s expedition, but the actions of people like Benjamin Church helped those after 
him to become better fighters against Native people. Likewise, Native people learned 
from the fighting experience of those war chiefs who led them in combat. Those war 
chiefs had similarly learned from their elders who passed down a wealth of strategic 
knowledge acquired over generations of military encounters. The purpose of this thesis is 
to examine how three key conflicts show how military thought and action changed or did 
not change over three centuries, from De Soto to Wayne and from Tascalusa to Blue 
Jacket.  
 From the European perspective I will discuss this transformation in terms of the 
use of Native allies, traditional line tactics, firearms, raiding, use of war animals, and the 
prolonged underestimation of Native enemies. On the Native side of the conflicts, I will 
discuss the use of omens, Native alliances ambush tactics, fortifications, the different 
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goals of war, raiding, and firearms. These themes are important because they are a major 
contribution to the war effort at large or a particular strategy or tactic. However, some of 
these themes may exhibit continuity, but consistency is important because it helps track 
what conditions change. More importantly is the fact that all themes have ample 
information in order to exhibit an equal presentation of change or consistency and to not 
make one side seem more important than the other. 
 Before I delve into these themes of warfare, I will briefly recap the important in-
conflict adaptations that were exposed in the previous chapters. De Soto’s expedition and 
King Philip’s War share a common theme in that there either is not enough evidence to 
make sound statements about military evolution or there was very limited change on 
either side. De Soto maintained the same combat patterns throughout his expedition. The 
Natives, although using a diversity of tactics, were not united across the Southeast to 
present a unified pan-Indian resistance against the Spanish. King Philip’s War shows 
much the same picture, in part due to the short duration of the conflict. However, the 
English made two important changes over the course of King Philip’s War in moving to 
better weapons and using Native allies. In contrast to the first two conflicts, the 
Northwest Indian War showed quite a bit of change. The micro changes that happened in 
this conflict were various, but came mainly from the Americans. These changes came in 
the form of establishing forts, proper training, and firing tactics. The Natives also showed 
some changes, but not all of them were beneficial. In particular at Fallen Timbers, the 
Native resistance decided to make a stand and fight from the tree line, which proved to be 
a disastrous change in strategy.  
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 The first theme I will discuss is the change in firearm technologies and their use. 
Although the wars discussed were not directly responsible for the changes in firearms 
technology, how the groups made use of guns demonstrates considerable change over 
time. As we transition from conflict to conflict the Native people increasingly saw the 
utility of guns, sometimes better than the Europeans from whom they obtained these 
weapons. By the time of the Northwest Indian War, firearms had become a staple in 
Native life. The gun had in many ways become to Native people what the bow and arrow 
had been. It was tool for hunting and a weapon of war. This adoption of the firearm as 
tool translated to their effectiveness in using it as a weapon.  
Europeans, on the other hand, seem to take a more reactionary approach to 
firearm usage. Instead of making adjustments proactively to the conflict, western leaders 
only made changes after seeing Natives use the same technology better or after suffering 
great losses. The best example of this comes from King Philip’s War. The English started 
the conflict using less effective matchlocks, before switching to more accurate flintlock. 
The training under General Wayne towards the end of the Northwest Indian War to pick 
targets instead of regular line fire shows a second reaction. A second point to make here 
relates to western ethnocentrism. While western powers typically underestimated their 
enemies they also overestimated their own capabilities. This overestimation can be linked 
with firearm usage and other technologies such as forts and cannons. Western military 
leaders not only viewed their own strategies and tactics as superior, but also their 
technology, even when the enemy had something that was extremely similar. 
It is evident that the gun trade profoundly impacted the results of these conflicts. 
Not only does the range difference matter, but so does the power difference. Firearms, 
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particularly rifles, have a longer range than bows, and being struck by a bullet is far more 
powerful than being struck by an arrow. In addition, whereas guns become more accurate 
and powerful over time, bows tended to stay the same. Though Native warriors could 
fashion their bows from various types of wood, the design was fairly similar across native 
cultures. This variation in wood did not always translate into higher accuracy or power. 
The one downside to firearms at this time, especially for Native people, would have been 
logistical issues. The availability of shot and ball would have plagued both sides of the 
conflict, but Native people who relied on European trade were at a particular 
disadvantage. Whereas they had the ability to produce their own bows and projectile 
points, they were dependent on Europeans and later Americans for access to gunpowder, 
bullets, and gun repairs.  
  Raiding was also an important strategy for both Euro-Americans and Indians. 
Each group, however, had its own agenda and purpose for using this tactic. Natives, I 
argue, conducted these raids because it was an integral component of Native warfare. 
Natives prized life and desired to minimize casualties. This is not to say that Europeans 
did not value life, but culturally Native groups wanted to replenish men lost in battle 
since they viewed loss of life as a spiritual and cosmological loss to the community as 
well as a physical loss of hunters, warriors, and providers.  Western powers, on the other 
hand, were somewhat of a paradox. Raiding was not entirely unknown to European 
warfare, but in the frontier it was not revered highly and at times it could be considered a 
violation of European rules of war. The disdain held by Western powers against Native 
raiding tactics on both a military and philosophical level did not deter their use. Indeed, 
Europeans justified violating their own rules of war when they fought against Indians 
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because they did not consider those rules as applicable to supposedly “savage” and 
“heathen” adversaries.   
 Native American raiding is probably the most significant part of Native war 
strategies for both its consistent usage and effectiveness. Throughout every conflict, 
whether it was attacking camps under De Soto or settlements during King Philip’s War 
and the Northwest Indian War, Native warriors used raids to hurt moral and disrupt daily 
activities. Yet, the motives for using this strategy did change over time.  During the first 
two wars, raids served reprisals for Native deaths and, specifically during De Soto’s 
expedition, Natives used raids to persuade De Soto to leave their territory. As time moved 
on, raids were used specifically to dissuade Americans from adventuring into Native 
territory during the Northwest Indian War. These activities were so effective that western 
military leaders began to adopt the same tactics in cases where they were not already 
being used. 
 Raiding was not unknown to European powers. By the time of establishment of 
the United States, western powers were well familiar with Native raids and were also 
well versed in using raids themselves. Throughout the first-hand accounts of these 
conflicts, we can see that the writers speak of these tactics with frustration and disdain. 
They also used this same language when referring to Native ambush tactics. Despite this 
hatred for raids, their qualms did not stop western powers from adopting this strategy 
against Native peoples. This adoption of raiding is a crucial component for the 
development of frontier warfare. When western military powers adopted Native raiding 
tactics, Native people feared their implementation as much as the European powers had. 
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 The first European theme and maybe the most important that we will discuss is 
the use of Native forces. This use of Native forces by Euro-Americans comes in various 
forms, from allies to servants, to slaves. The second two wars demonstrate how effective 
Indian allies could be. English and Euro-American leaders in both King Philip’s War and 
the Northwest Indian War used Native allies as scouts to help gather military intelligence. 
In what Wayne E. Lee refers to as strategic reach and strategic mobility, he describes 
how Native forces benefitted western armies in two very important fashions.349 The first 
or strategic mobility is the ability of a force to go undetected with the help of scouts. The 
second is strategic reach, which means a force can go farther for longer without fear of 
running into unseen enemy forces. De Soto, on the other hand, relied on much harsher 
methods in regards to Native individuals in his army. Instead of using them as 
counterinsurgents he used them as burden bearers and the occasional guide, but obtained 
these individuals through strong-arming the local cacique.  
 Euro-America forces consistently underestimated Native forces, for over three 
centuries. The idea of western superiority based on ideas of religion, race, and technology 
had lasting effects on Indian-European relationships throughout the history of the 
colonization of North America. This underestimation of Native abilities in warfare led 
directly to both substantial loss of life on the European/Euro-American side and the 
prolonging of conflicts. If western military leaders had given Native tactics the respect 
they deserved, disasters such as Bloody Brook and St. Clair’s Defeat may not have 
happened. Of course there are other elements that led to these defeats, such as the lack of 
military intelligence, but my statement holds. De Soto’s expedition I believe is 																																																								
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marginally different. De Soto’s expedition was less about the Spanish underestimating 
their enemy, but more so about the Spanish overestimating their own capabilities. De 
Soto no doubt thought of his opponents as less than himself, but De Soto’s decisions were 
also based on his arrogance.  
 In somewhat of an ironic turn of events, this underestimation of Native tactics, 
although leading to major defeats, did not have enough of an impact to affect the outcome 
of these conflicts. In both King Philip’s War and the Northwest Indian War, the Native 
tribes handed the English and Americans numerous defeats directly related to the 
arrogance of western leaders. Yet, the advantage in manpower and logistic capabilities 
allowed the western commanders to make these mistakes and still win out in the end. 
Once again De Soto’s expedition does not follow this pattern as closely. De Soto did not 
have the manpower or logistics to outlast the loss of life his army suffered. Although 
Spanish forces eventually made it out of the American Southeast, they suffered heavy 
losses along the way and were not able to establish a permanent colony in the region. 
 I would like to make a quick note here about English linear tactics that have been 
alluded to and described in multiple locations in the previous chapters. Linear tactics 
played a key role in western battle tactics in King Philip’s War and the Northwest Indian 
War. However, the sources are scant in a few places to describe when and where exactly 
these lines stood during individual battles, especially in King Philip’s War. It is almost as 
if it is assumed that we know how the English fought without any context, which is 
doubtful. The Northwest Indian War did show a small shift in linear tactics. The picking 
of individual targets, although new, did not outright eliminate linear firing as an effective 
method. The carnage of the American Civil War is evident of this fact.  
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 War animals were also an important aspect of Euro-American warfare. De Soto 
used both cavalry and war dogs throughout his encounters to great effect. Native peoples 
had never encountered these beasts before, and they induced panic that gave the Spanish 
an advantage. In contrast, war animals were almost absent in King Philip’s War. The 
English did have and use horses for movement, but they were not used in a traditional 
European cavalry sense. The dense forest of the Northeast did not make it conducive to 
cavalry engagements. By the time of the Northwest Indian War, it was well established 
that Indians did not do well in combat against cavalry; therefore American forces utilized 
cavalry. Despite the fact that the terrain was not conducive to cavalry engagements, the 
inability of Native forces, even en mass, to fight cavalry regiments out weighed the 
terrain disadvantages. 
 Native people adopted horses very quickly after their introduction by the Spanish 
in the sixteenth century. Plains Indians are famous for their use of horses in hunting bison 
and cavalry engagements with the United States in the nineteenth century, but horses 
were prevalent all across North America. The issue in question here is whether or not the 
Indians in any of the conflicts in question used horses in some form of combat role. The 
simple answer for De Soto is no. Natives had not yet acquired the horse in that capacity. 
The next two conflicts present a much more complicated picture. The sources are largely 
silent to the Native use of horses, except when they were stealing them.350 There is no 
explicit mention of Native usage of horses in a cavalry capacity in open combat. 
However, it is likely that Northwest and possibly Northeast Natives used horses to travel 
and to perpetuate their raids against frontier settlements.   																																																								350	William Heath, William Wells and the Struggles for the Old Northwest (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2015), 85.	
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 Let us now turn to Native warfare beginning with the theme of Native 
fortifications. If you recall from De Soto’s expedition and King Philip’s War, there were 
Native-made fortifications, but none in the Northwest Indian War. The fortifications that 
existed in the time of King Philip’s War were similar to those of the Mississippian 
Southeast. In both periods fortifications existed in the form of palisaded towns. However 
in one particular instance we can see a change in Native palisades during King Philip’s 
War. In the case of the Great Swamp Fight, we see a fort that has been influenced by the 
English colonists. This suggests that Native people had learned from and adopted some of 
the fortification strategies of Europeans. However, this seems to be an anomaly, because 
of the lack of evidence of other forts existing with a similar style. By the time of the 
Northwest Indian War there were no longer any large Native fortifications. 
Native people were not alien to siege warfare, but the arrival of European 
technology drastically changed their approach. The arrival of cannons and firearms made 
it more difficult for Natives to take forts, but also to defend their own forts. While it is 
true the Native acquisition of firearms leveled the playing field somewhat, items like 
cannons rendered Native fortifications almost futile. The Northwest Indian War is the 
only conflict in which Native warriors directly faced western cannons in this thesis. The 
important point here is that western weapons technology made maintaining and holding 
fortifications difficult for Native people. The Natives learned their lesson, however, and 
abandoned fortifications by the time of the Northwest Indian War, because of their 
ineffectiveness against English and American armies, but there may have been other 
reasons for their abandonment not accounted for in this thesis.  
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Omens also figured prominently in Indian warfare. There has been at least one 
instance in each conflict where I have described how an omen affected a Native decision 
in warfare. Omens show a moment of continuity in Native warfare. This is important to 
note because even after several hundred years of contact, Native people still relied on 
their belief systems. In the De Soto expedition we see one example with the rains at 
Chicaza. Tribes in both of the later conflicts relied on their spiritual interpretations when 
deciding to go into battle. The initiation of King Philip’s War was based on astronomical 
event perceived as an omen of war. In the Northwest Indian War, Native spiritual beliefs 
were used to determine attacks and troop deployments. This continued use of omens and 
the prevalence of spiritual interpretations display the enduring nature of Native beliefs 
systems in conflicts. 
Intra-Indian alliances were important and took many forms throughout these 
conflicts. In all three conflicts there was some assemblage of Native peoples working 
together against western powers. In both De Soto’s expedition and King Philip’s War 
there were Indian alliances. Most likely there were alliances already in place before the 
conflicts. The Mississippian chiefdoms and Wampanoags utilized these preexisting 
systems to help garner allies to fight against the Spanish and the English. Specifically 
King Philip utilized alliances that had been built by ancestors in the form of tributaries of 
military allies. In the Northwest Indian War, the pan-Indian alliance was primarily based 
upon common goals and perceptions of American expansion. The constant pressure early 
on from the British and ultimately the Americans forced the Natives in the Ohio Territory 
to make the decision to defend the land by any means necessary.  
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 In terms of tactics, Indian ambush tactics were probably the most important theme 
for Native people. This theme is relatively continuous throughout the conflicts. Whether 
used on a small scale by a minimal number of men, like with the Apalachee during De 
Soto’s expedition, or on a large scale like St. Clair’s Defeat, the effectiveness of the 
ambush cannot be understated. We have covered several examples of Native forces using 
the terrain to their advantage, and coupled with western arrogance these forces, obtained 
admirable victories. Each one of these encounters exhibits the same features. Native 
forces waited at certain locations or formed up around an already established camp and 
surprised their enemy. These attacks came under cover of darkness or early in the 
morning before their enemy was completely ready. If the Natives began to lose their 
advantage, they retreated back into the cover of the forest and escaped death or capture in 
some cases.  
The effectiveness of Native ambushes although consistent over time was often 
lessened over the course of a particular war. For example, when Western armies, such as 
The Legion under Anthony Wayne, finally learned from their mistakes and began to use 
Native allies the effectiveness of Native ambushes was lessened. Native ambushes could 
also be averted by properly setting up in defensible positions as was presented in the 
Northwest Indian War when Harmar properly fortified a position after his defeat. When 
General Wayne began to use Choctaw scouts his main force was protected, but his forces 
without scouts remained in danger. Once the ability of Native forces to perform 
ambushes was taken away, it stifled the Indian strategic repertoire. We can see this in the 
two later wars when the Natives chose to take alternative measures or simply could not 
find an appropriate replacement. For example, in both King Philip’s and the Northwest 
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Indian War, when the English and American forces began using Native allies the 
conflicts came to a quick close. In King Philip’s War, the pursuit of Philip was enabled 
through the use of Native allies, while General Wayne used allied Natives to screen for 
his main army against enemy attacks eventually leading to the Battle of Fallen Timbers. 
 Typically speaking, Native goals in warfare were to avenge death and obtain 
captives, not to unconditionally defeat an enemy or to win by any cost, but over time 
these motivations began to change. During De Soto’s expedition Native fought against 
him because he was taking Native food stores and slaves. Even during the large battles 
such as Mabila and Chicaza, Native forces were fighting to prove themselves against the 
Spanish and to force the foreigners to move on. Despite the Native forces losing the fight 
in Spanish eyes, it may have well been a victory from the Native perspective. By the time 
of King Philip’s War, they were fighting to defend their sovereignty and their territory. 
The English’s continual pushes onto Native land and the many affronts to Native 
sovereignty caused the Wampanoag and their allies to strike against the English. In the 
Northwest Indian War the pan-Indian alliance was deliberately fighting the Americans to 
prevent them from taking their land. Even though the old ideas of Native warfare such as 
blood revenge may have played a part in particular attacks, the larger scope of the 
conflicts became much more complicated. 
 I chose these themes for one reason. First they show how Native people adapted 
to European styles of warfare, but maintained uniquely Native styles of war. This is 
somewhat similar to what I stated in regards to European adaptations. The difference here 
is that Native Americans never truly adopted any western tactics, but simply adapted to 
their new military situation. Unfortunately, Native capabilities in war did not hold up 
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against the wave of European and American insurgents. Dwindling Native populations 
from disease and different goals in warfare made it difficult for Natives to compete 
militarily over time. Even though Native strategies were successful in particular 
situations they were not successful in winning the conflicts, as evident by the results. 
Western ideologies and manpower ultimately overwhelmed Native abilities to resist 
militarily. That being said, Native forces held their own in many circumstances as I hope 
I have shown here. I am challenging the idea that Native resistance was futile. Native 
warriors and war chiefs had many successes and dealt explorers and colonists deadly 
blows, but in the end the Natives would lose. 
 It is hard to imagine what it would have been like to fight as anyone I have 
covered in this thesis. One of my personal goals in this thesis was to convey a forgotten 
part of the American identity, the identity of the frontier fighter. Frontier warfare was part 
of a larger colonial process and become integral to American expansion and imperialism 
almost into the twentieth century. All three conflicts I discuss played key roles in shaping 
political structures, military structures, and personal identities. In the end I believe I have 
completed all the goals I set for myself. Warfare may be integral to mankind’s history, 
but it changes in the same way as other portions of society. American history is writhe 
with other conflicts that play an important role in shaping the country we know today as 
United States of America, but in regards to the Eastern Woodlands, these conflicts, I 
believe, deserve a position at towards the top when it comes to their importance in 
shaping that particular area.  
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